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THE TORT OF BAD FAITH IN FIRST-PARTY
INSURANCE TRANSACTIONS: REFINING THE
STANDARD OF CULPABILITY AND REFORMULATING
THE REMEDIES BY STATUTE
Roger C. Henderson*
INTRODUCTION
The opportunity to witness the appearance of a wholly new
tort in the legal universe is rare indeed. Although tort law
has undergone extensive change since the 1800s, there may
not have been more than three or four completely new torts
recognized this century. Contrary to what one might con-
clude from all the activity in this area, particularly since
World War II, courts have not been quick to create wholly
new causes of action. Most often, courts simply have re-
moved barriers to suit or have modified the law so as to
extend existing tort duties to cover somewhat similar fact
situations. Aside from the developments in the areas of
strict liability for products, invasion of privacy, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, there may be only one
other kind of situation that legitimately can be viewed as
giving rise to a truly new cause of action in tort law. This
situation involves the wrongful failure of an insurance com-
pany to pay benefits to its insured and was first recognized
by a court of last resort in the early 1970s. 1
For over a century from the time it was decided, the courts
followed the common-law rule announced in Hadley v.
Baxendale2 that damages for breach of contract were limited
to those in the contemplation of the parties at the time the
bargain was struck.3 Consequential damages, as a general
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona, College of Law. B.B.A. 1960,
University of Texas; LL.B. 1965, University of Texas; LL.M. 1969, Harvard University.
1. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Cal. 1973).
2. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
3. Id. at 151.
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rule, were more exclusively within the realm of tort law4
than that of contracts, and it was no tort for a party to
breach a contract, even when the breach was intentional.5
So firmly was this rule fixed in the Anglo-American legal
firmament that some even asserted that a party may have a
"right" to breach by standing ready to pay for any loss of
bargain.6 It is in society's interest, so went the argument,
that a party should be permitted to elect to breach without
incurring consequential damages, so that a more efficient
allocation of resources would result.7 Predictability was the
watchword; one should be able to count on the courts to
adhere closely to the terms of the bargain in defining the
damages to be recovered for any breach. Rights arising ex
contractu were not to be as expansive, or as uncertain, as
those arising ex delicto, at least as far as damages were
concerned.
Perhaps there are still situations where a willful refusal to
perform a contract may be economically advantageous because
of this limitation on damages, but there clearly is one group of
contracting parties that no longer may indulge themselves
under the guise of Hadley. Today, in most jurisdictions, no
well-informed insurance company possibly could see anything
to be gained by such conduct. On the contrary, insurers are
exposed to significant damage awards beyond the traditional
contract measure for intentional breaches under what has come
to be known as the tort of bad faith.' In a steadily growing
4. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.3, at 812 (1973).
It is recognized that modern courts have expanded the right to recover consequential
damages in contract cases, but this is still the exception and is rationalized under the
rubric of being within the contemplation of the parties. I& at 812-14. Moreover, the
awards are still primarily for pecuniary loss only. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1341 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1968).
5. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 874-75 (2d ed. 1990).
6. For a discussion of the so-called "efficient breach" theory in contract law, see
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.3, at 847-49; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 4.8 (4th ed. 1992); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach
of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract,
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970).
7. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.3, at 847; see also Patton v. Mid-Continent
Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., adopting efficient breach
theory).
8. This new tort is established so clearly that it has already spawned several
treatises. See, e.g., STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
(1984); JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FAITH (5th ed. 1990); WILLIAM
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number of jurisdictions, insurers not only are exposed to
consequential damages for economic loss and emotional distress
for failing to deal with their insureds fairly and in good faith,9
but they also may be subject to substantial awards of punitive
damages. 10  The tort of bad-faith breach of contract-an
incongruous concept only a short time ago-now routinely is
alleged in cases brought by insureds against their insurers.
Moreover, in many cases, insureds succeed in recovering
substantial tort damages under this new cause of action."
Some commentators consider this development to be salutary,
an evening of the playing field so long dominated by the
insurers. 12  Others view it as having a most baleful effect.
13
Perhaps it is too early to make a final judgment about the
overall effects, but one thing is clear. What initially was
dubbed as a new intentional tort appears to be hemorrhaging.
It is no longer apparent, if it ever was, that the tort of bad faith
lies only for a conscious violation of the insured's rights. Some
courts appear to have gone beyond this intentional tort
standard to include reckless, if not negligent, conduct as addi-
tional bases for the new tort. 4 This is a cause for concern be-
cause it raises considerable doubts as to what the standard of
culpability includes. The lack of certainty does not bode well
for those who must shape their conduct so as to be able to ad-
here to the new rule. Moreover, an extension of the basis of
culpability beyond conscious wrongdoing into areas of
M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION (1991); DENNIS J. WALL, LITIGATION
AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH (1985).
9. See infra notes 101-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 101-24 and accompanying text.
11. One study involving litigation in San Francisco, California and Cook County,
Illinois for a 25-year period from 1960 through 1984 concluded that the most dramatic
increases in punitive damage awards occurred in the area of contract cases, many of
which involved the tort of bad faith. See MARK PETERSON ETAL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 19-24 (1987); see also DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY
BEHIND THE STATISTICS 12-21 (1987) (discussing reasons for the general increase in the
size of jury verdicts).
12. See, e.g., Amy G. Langerman & Richard W. Langerman, Arizona Insurance Bad
Faith and the Doctrine of Strict Liability, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 359, 363-65 (1990);
Mary E. Phelan, The First Party Dilemma: Bad Faith or Bad Business?, 34 DRAKE L.
REV. 1031, 1035-37 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Glenn L. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative
Intervention, 13 PAC. LJ. 833,852-54 (1982); Paul B. Butler, Jr. & Robert V. Potter, Jr.,
The Primary Carrier Caught in the Middle with Bad Faith Exposure to Its Insureds,
Excess Carriers and Reinsurers, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 118, 121-22 (1988).
14. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
FALL 1992]
4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:1
inadvertency may be unwarranted, particularly if a full-blown
measure of tort damages is made available to the insured.
After hundreds of appellate court decisions, the common law
surrounding this new tort shows little prospect of "working
itself pure."15 Many questions have arisen and remain to be
answered. Should the tort lie only for intentional conduct, or
should recklessness also suffice? If so, what is "reckless"
conduct in the insurance claims-processing context?16 Should
there also be room for a cause of action based upon negligence
or even some role for strict liability in this area? Should a full-
blown measure of tort damages be available, regardless of the
level of culpability; and should the law permit awards for
prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees, even where the in-
surer is not guilty of bad faith? Appropriate answers to these
and other questions1" are long overdue, and it is beginning to
appear that the courts may not be able to derive all of the
answers from the traditional common-law pronouncements on
remedies. At the very least, it is time to consider answers and
alternatives that may best be approached through the legisla-
tive process.
This Article explores the common-law and statutory back-
ground of the tort of bad faith in first-party insurance situa-
tions, analyzes the varying standards of culpability that have
been developed by the courts, and suggests a uniform statutory
solution to the problems created by the varying standards.'8
The statute also tailors the remedies more closely to the
15. Over a century ago, one court argued that a virtue of the common-law system
is its ability to correct its own mistakes over time:
One excellence of the common law is, that it works itself pure, by drawing from
the fountain of reason, so that if errors creep into it, upon reasons, which more
enlarged views and a higher state of enlightenment, growing out of the extension
of commerce and other causes, proves to be fallacious, they may be worked out by
subsequent decisions.
Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 37, 39 (1856).
16. For example, how should the traditional standards of culpability, which fall
short of the orthodox definition of an intentional tort, be applied in a situation where
the insurer-actor almost always acts intentionally when passing on claims, that is,
consciously refuses to pay an insured, knowing that economic and other harm probably
will flow from the refusal?
17. For example, should the tort be limited to wrongful refusals of insurers to pay
claims of their insureds or should it apply to other obligations of insurers, including
third-party insurance contracts?
18. See infra Appendix.
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particular type of insurer wrongdoing. The proposed remedies
recognize the dual nature of the insurer-insured relationship,
that is, one based upon contract and tort concepts. Such a
statute would eliminate many of the ambiguities and other
deficiencies in the common law of those states that already
have adopted the new tort. In addition, the proposed statutory
solution would provide clear guidelines to those states where
the courts so far have refused to adopt the new tort or have not
faced all of the issues.
A uniform act like the one suggested would provide even-
handed and fair treatment to insurers and insureds alike across
the country. There is no reason why the parties to an
insurance contract should be treated differently depending on
their location. After all, it is the insureds that ultimately pay
for the losses, and their rights ought to be the same. It also is
essential to a healthy insurance industry that insurers face the
same obligations across the country. The most efficient method
of accomplishing these goals is through legislation because the
courts simply have not come to the type of consensus that is
necessary to preserve the rights and obligations of the parties
and the public interest in a balanced fashion. In short, the
state legislatures are in the best position to assure that a fair
and consistent set of rules is being applied in all the states by
adopting a uniform act.
I. COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. Insurance Contracts at Common Law
Until relatively recently, policies of insurance ordinarily were
not accorded any special treatment in the law of contracts. 9
19. Perhaps the law of warranties would be viewed as an exception. Before Lord
Mansfield's tenure as Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, which began in 1756,
courts treated a warranty in an insurance contract the same as warranties in general.
A warranty was merely a condition that had to be strictly performed, but there was
nothing to indicate that an immaterial breach would work a forfeiture. Lord Mansfield,
however, soon created a difference with regard to contracts of insurance. In a line of
cases beginning in 1763 with Woolmer v. Muilman, 96 Eng. Rep. 243 (K.B. 1763), and
culminating in 1786 with De Hahn v. Hartley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1786), the Chief
Justice eliminated any materiality requirement by holding that even an immaterial
breach of warranty would permit an insurer to avoid the contract. See William R.
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For example, although the rule that ambiguities are to be
construed against the drafter-contra proferentum-may be
referred to most frequently in insurance cases, it is applied
routinely in all types of contract disputes.2" Likewise, the
doctrine of reasonable expectations2 probably is identified most
closely with the interpretation of insurance policies, but it is
recognized by the American Law Institute as falling within
generally accepted principles regarding the enforcement of all
standard form contracts.' Even the rule that there is an
Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 YALE L.J.
523, 524-32 (1911).
Even though a number of states have attempted to change Lord Mansfield's rule by
statute, and some courts have in some respects ameliorated its harsh consequences by
common-law decision, it still has vitality today. See ROBERTE. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW § 6.6 (1988).
20. The first Restatement of Contracts declares, "Where words or other
manifestations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an interpretation
is preferred which operates more strongly against the party from whom they proceed,
unless their use by him is prescribed by law." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(d)
(1932).
21. A noted insurance law scholar first articulated the doctrine of reasonable
expectations in 1970: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expecta-
tions." Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARv. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970).
22. The American Law Institute subsumed the doctrine of reasonable expectations
under the provision that deals generally with form contracts:
§ 211. Standardized Agreements
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he
adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included
in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term,
the term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
At least two courts have justified their recognition of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations on the authority of the Second Restatement. See Darner Motor Sales, Inc.
v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388,396 (Ariz. 1984); C & J Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 172, 176 (Iowa 1975). It remains to be seen,
however, whether the Restatement formulation provides the outer boundaries of the
doctrine, at least with regard to insurance contracts. See Roger C. Henderson, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 823, 852-53 (1990).
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing-a rule relied on
by a number of courts as the basis for the tort of bad faith-is
applied to all contracts and all contracting parties, not just
insurance contracts and insurers alone. 23 As mentioned earlier,
courts have applied to all contract breaches the rule limiting
damages to those foreseeable by the breaching party when the
contract was made. 4  Consequential economic loss and
emotional distress were not compensable except under
exceptional circumstances.' There was no exception for
insurance policies. Nor was there an exception for damages
that would punish the breaching party. As a general rule,
punitive damages were not available for breach of contract,ss
and this held true for breaches by insurers.2
The similarities between insurance contract disputes and all
other contract disputes were also buttressed by another time-
honored position under American common law. In the event of
a legal dispute, each party is to bear the expense of his own
attorney regardless of who prevails.' Thus, traditionally the
impact on an insured who had to resort to legal process to
remedy an insurer's breach of an insurance policy was no more
or less serious than the impact on any other person who had to
resort to legal process to remedy the breach of a contract. In
over two hundred years of insurance contract litigation, no
distinctive set of common-law rules emerged to govern the rela-
tionship between an insurer and its insureds.
This commonality, however, between insurance and other
contracts was not to endure and probably could not have en-
dured, given the role that insurance has come to play in this
country. In fact, insurance contracts are not like other
23. The Second Restatement of Contracts provides, "Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4,
§ 670, at 159 (1961) ("The underlying principle is that there is an implied covenant that
neither party will do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the frits of the contract ... ."). The essence of the
duty is that neither party will act to impair the right of the other to receive the benefits
which flow from their agreement or contractual relationship. Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958); Brown v. Superior Court, 212 P.2d 878,
881 (Cal. 1949).
24. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981).
25. See id. §§ 347, 353 & commentary.
26. Id. § 355.
27. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.8, at 876-77.
28. See DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3.8, at 194.
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contracts because, in the aggregate, they occupy a unique
institutional role in any modern, capitalistic society. Conse-
quently, forces and conditions not of their making have had a
great impact on the parties to insurance contracts and have
provided the social basis for the distinctive legal treatment
accorded breaches of first-party insurance contracts today.
B. Economic Development and the Role of Insurance
Professor Edwin Patterson once opined that the peculiarities
of an insurance contract derive from its nature as an aleatory,
as distinguished from a commutative, contract:
In making the latter type of contract, the parties con-
template a fairly even exchange of values. In a sale, which
is a typical commutative contract, the seller thinks that the
price paid is about equal to the value of the goods, and the
buyer expects to get goods about equal to his price. On the
contrary, in making an insurance contract, the insured
knows that he is paying a sum far less than the insurer is
to pay him under certain conditions that will probably not
occur. Insurance is an aleatory contract; the conditions are
a part of the bargain. They define the risks that the
insurer agrees to bear for a group of persons exposed to
similar risks and paying similar contributions to the fund
from which losses are to be paid. The law looks back of the
contract to the institution of which it is a part.2
In other words, insurance contracts are private arrangements
for hedging against the possibility of loss, and it is this risk-
transfer-and-distribution quality that distinguishes them from
other kinds of contracts with regard to economic consequences.
But, institutionally speaking, the sum of the parts is greater
than the whole, for they serve an even broader purpose.
On the one hand, insurance contracts, like other contracts,
consist of individual exchange relationships as a matter of pri-
vate agreement between insurers and insureds. On the other
29. EDWIN W. PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 62 (2ded. 1957) (footnote
omitted).
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hand, their terms reflect matters of interest common to all
insureds.3" One object of insurance contracts is to spread the
risk of certain perils among the many who are subject to the
perils. From the beginning, as stated nearly four centuries ago,
the purpose of insurance agreements has been to prevent the
"undoinge of any Man, but the losse lightethe rather easilie
upon many, then heavilie upon fewe."31 Thus, insurance
contracts always have had an important public purpose in
addition to their private purpose. Because of this quality, these
arrangements take on more social importance as a capitalistic
society develops economically and becomes more affluent.
There is more economic risk to be insured against and the
insurance industry, as a social institution, therefore plays an
increasingly vital role in the process of economic development.
In a free enterprise system, economic development steadily
increases the number of situations in which individuals can
suffer "loss." At the same time, economic development
enhances the ability to avoid the prospect of "loss." In other
words, in a relatively affluent society, there is much more to
lose in the way of property and other economic interests as the
human condition improves. In such a society, however,
individuals are more likely to have the requisite discretionary
income to transfer and to spread the attendant risks of loss.
Disruptive losses to society, as well as to the individual, are
obviated or minimized by private agreements among similarly
situated people. In this way, the insurance industry plays a
very important institutional role by providing the level of
predictability requisite for the planning and execution that
leads to further development. Without effective planning and
execution, a society cannot progress.
In contrast, to take the more extreme case, in a hand-to-
mouth society there is relatively less at risk. Life is a chore in
any event. Moreover, to the extent that there is risk of loss, the
30. Professor Lon Fuller observed that there are two fundamental forms of social
order. One is a relationship based upon reciprocity or exchange where people tend to
deal more or less at arm's length. The other relationship is one of common ends or a
shared interest-for example, building a wall to protect against some common problem
or threat. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 425-26 (1958). An insurance contract would
seem to combine both relationships.
31. An Acte concerninge matters of Assurances, amongste Marchantes, 1601, 43
Eliz., ch. 12 (Eng.).
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necessary discretionary income which individuals would pool in
any private risk distribution plan is less apt to exist. Thus,
when disaster strikes, it is likely to be calamitous because the
losses are not shared by those unaffected by the particular
event. Nevertheless, planning for the future must be secondary
to the more immediate problem of survival.
This perceived social significance has set apart insurance
contracts from most other contracts in the eyes of the law.
Insurance is purchased routinely and has become pervasive in
our society.32 It protects against losses that otherwise would
disrupt our lives, individually and collectively. The public
interest, as well as the individual interests of millions of in-
sureds, is at stake. This is the foundation for the general
judicial conclusion that the business of insurance is cloaked
with a public purpose or interest.' This perception also
32. According to insurance industry figures, in 1990 premium receipts for all forms
of insurance in the United States exceeded $600 billion. INSURANCE INFORMATION INST.,
THE FACT BOOK: PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE FACTS 5 (1992). The United States
accounted for 37.45% of the world's premium volume in 1989. Id. at 15. Some 96% of
the nation's home owners, and 26% of the renters, carried household insurance in 1989
to protect themselves against potential losses. I& at 14. Also during 1989, nearly 87%
of the civilian noninstitutionalized population was protected by health-care coverage.
HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 9 (1991). As of
1990, there were over nine trillion dollars of life insurance in force in the United States.
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1991 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK UPDATE 4 (1991).
One contracts scholar has observed:
The final and perhaps most significant characteristic of insurance contracts
differentiating them from ordinary, negotiated commercial contracts, is the in-
creasing tendency of the public to look upon the insurance policy not as a contract
but as a special form of chattel. The typical applicant buys "protection" much as
he buys groceries. The protection is intangible, to be sure, but he is reassured by
the words of the agent and by the fact that agent and company are regulated by
the state and licensed to do business there....
In conclusion, for most purposes, insurance must still be considered a contract
between insurer and insured, but it is a very special type of contract and one
currently involved in a prolonged period of popular and judicial gestation from
which it may well eventually emerge as a new and special form of chattel, or
perhaps, quasi-chattel.
7 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 900, at 34, 36-37 (1963) (footnote omitted).
33. As early as 1914, the Supreme Couit of the United States, in upholding the
power of the states to regulate the business of insurance, based its decision on the
conclusion that the business had become clothed with a public interest:
The restrictions upon the legislative power which complainant urges we have
discussed, or rather the considerations which take, it is contended, the business
of insurance outside of the sphere of the power. To the contention that the
FALL 1992] The Tort of Bad Faith
explains the extensive regulation of the insurance industry in
the United States, not just through legislative and admini-
strative processes, but also through the judicial process., In
fact, as with developments in other areas of tort law, the
recognition of the tort of bad faith in insurance cases represents
a judicial response to the perceived failure of the other
branches of government to regulate adequately the claims pro-
cesses of the insurance industry. Had the early attempts at
regulation been more effective, the tort of bad faith might never
have come into existence.
C. Early Attempts at Regulation of
Insurance Claims Practices
As discussed above, insurance policies occupy a unique
position in the modern law of contracts. This singular status
has given rise to a new tort, but this legal development was not
inevitable. As in so many other areas, the common law in the
area of insurance contract law has responded to a social need
that was not met by other institutions. Traditionally, the
business is private we have opposed the conception of the public interest. We
have shown that the business of insurance has very definite characteristics, with
a reach of influence and consequence beyond and different from that of the
ordinary businesses of the commercial world, to pursue which a greater liberty
may be asserted. The transactions of the latter are independent and individual,
terminating in their effect with the instances. The contracts of insurance may be
said to be interdependent. They cannot be regarded singly, or isolatedly, and the
effect of their relation is to create a fund of assurance and credit, the companies
becoming the depositories of the money of the insured, possessing great power
thereby and charged with great responsibility. How necessary their solvency is,
is manifest. On the other hand to the insured, insurance is an asset, a basis of
credit. It is practically a necessity to business activity and enterprise. It is,
therefore, essentially different from ordinary commercial transactions, and, as we
have seen, according to the sense of the world from the earliest times-certainly
the sense of the modern world-is of the greatest public concern....
... The principle we apply is definite and old and has, as we have pointed out,
illustrating examples. And both by the expression of the principle and the
citation of the examples we have tried to confine our decision to the regulation of
the business of insurance, it having become "clothed with a public interest," and
therefore subject "to be controlled by the public for the common good."
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 414-15 (1914).
34. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 8.
35. See id. §§ 6-7 (describing many instances ofjudicial regulation by recognizing
rights on behalf of insureds that are at variance with the actual terms of the contract).
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common law did not penalize insurers either for a delayed
payment or for an outright refusal to pay a claim, even when
the insurer's conduct plainly was unjustified.' The insured
usually was entitled only to the amount due under the policy,
no matter that legal expenses may have been incurred to force
compliance by the insurer.17 The possibility of recovering other
damages that may have been suffered as a result of the delay
was even more remote.
The process of change, however, did not begin with the
courts. Around the turn of this century, the legislatures took
the initiative and began to enact statutes providing for recovery
of attorneys' fees,3 and sometimes penalties or interest,39 when
an insurer in some manner defaulted on its obligation to
provide the benefits under the policy.40 Some statutes provided
for recovery of these extra-contractual fees and penalties only
when the insurer acted in an unreasonable manner,4 ' whereas
others made them available simply for not paying claims within
a certain time period.42 These statutes signaled the onset of a
change, albeit a slow one.
36. See id. § 7.7(a).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 21, 1927, ch. 231, § 40-908, 1927 Kan. Sess. Laws 345; Act
of Apr. 21, 1913, ch. 234, § 1, 1913 Neb. Laws 738; see also Main v. Benjamin Foster
Co., 192 So. 602, 604-05 (Fla. 1939) (construing the 1917 version of a Florida statute,
the original of which was enacted in 1893, providing attorneys' fees against certain
types of insurers).
39. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 29, 1905, No. 115, 1905 Ark. Acts 307 (providing
attorneys' fees plus 12% damages calculated upon the amount of the loss); Act of Aug.
23, 1872, § 16, 1872 Ga. Laws 43 (providing attorneys' fees plus an amount not to
exceed 25% of the insurer's liability); Act of June 29, 1937, § 155, 1937 Ill. Laws 765
(providing attorneys' fees plus an amount not to exceed any one of the following: 25%
of the recovery, $500, or the amount recovered in excess of that which the insurer may
have offered to pay in settlement); Act of Mar. 30, 1911, § 1, 1911 Mo. Laws 282
(providing attorneys' fees, interest, and an amount not to exceed 10% of the insured
loss).
40. For a collection of cases construing a number of the early statutes providing
for attorneys' fees and penalties, see E.B. Morris, Annotation, What Persons or
Corporations, Contracts or Policies, Are Within Statutory Provisions Allowing Recovery
of Attorney's Fees or Penalty Against Companies Dealing in Specified Kinds of
Insurance, 126 A.L.R. 1439 (1940).
41. See, e.g., Act of June 29, 1937, § 155, 1937 IlI. Laws 765 (allowing fees and
penalties where the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious and without reasonable
cause).
42. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 29, 1905, No. 115, 1905 Ark. Acts 307 (allowing fees and
penalties where demand was made by the insured and the insurer failed to pay within
the time specified in the policy).
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Although the legislative efforts at regulating the claims
process were rather minimal, they were not completely
insignificant; they constituted the first recognition that a
problem existed. Still, many states did not follow suit.
43
Moreover, those that did failed to follow any particular
pattern.4 As a result, most insureds continued to find
themselves at a considerable disadvantage in a contest with
insurers over unpaid claims.
The insureds' disadvantage persisted as insurance took on
more and more importance in this country. In order to
purchase a home or a car, or commercial property, most people
had to borrow money, and loans were not obtainable unless the
property was insured. In addition, the lender often required
that the life of the borrower be insured. On another front, the
cost of medical care was rising beyond the reach of many people
and insurance programs were developed to spread that risk.45
The purchase of insurance was no longer a matter of prudence;
it was a necessity. Then losses occurred and the inevitable
disputes arose. These disputes, however, were not about an
even exchange in value.46 Rather, they were about something
quite different.
Insureds bought insurance to avoid the possibility of
unaffordable losses, but all too often they found themselves em-
broiled in an argument over that very possibility. Disputes
over the allocation of the underlying loss worsened the
insureds' predicament. In most instances, insureds were
seriously disadvantaged because of the uncompensated loss;
after all, the insured would not have insured against this peril
unless it presented a serious risk of disruption in the first
place. The prospect of paying attorneys' fees and other
litigation expenses, in addition to the burden of collecting from
the insurer, with no assurance of recovery, only aggravated the
situation.
43. As late as 1951, only about one-fourth of the states had enacted statutes
providing for attorney's fees and penalties. WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF INSURANCE 46 (1951).
44. See id.
45. See Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking
Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 214-48
(1980) (discussing the origins of the private health insurance system and the reasons
for rising health-care costs).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
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These additional expenses could prove to be a formidable
deterrent to the average insured. For most insureds, unlike
insurers, such expenses were not an anticipated cost of doing
business. Insureds did not plan for litigation as an institutional
litigant would. Insurers, on the other hand, built the
anticipated costs of litigation into the premium rate structure.
In effect, insureds, by paying premiums, financed the insurers'
ability to resist claims. Insureds, as a group, were therefore
peculiarly vulnerable to insurers who, as a group, were inclined
to pay nothing if they could get away with it, and, in any event,
to pay as little as possible. Insurance had become big business.
As public resentment of insurance companies increased, the
practices of the industry itself helped prepare the way for more
pervasive regulation.
In the 1970s, the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) began to develop model legislation aimed at
unfair claims settlement practices of the insurance industry."7
Although this legislation, or some variation of it, has now been
adopted by all but a half-dozen states, 8 it has not materially
aided the individual claimant. The model legislation prohibits
certain acts by an insurer only when committed flagrantly and
in conscious disregard of the statute or with such frequency as
to indicate a general business practice. 9  In such cir-
cumstances, the state insurance regulator is empowered to seek
injunctive relief or penalties to enforce the statutory pro-
visions.5 0 This language, when coupled with the fact that the
legislation is silent as to any remedies on behalf of individual
47. The NAIC had previously developed and promulgated a model act regulating
unfair trade practices of insurers which had been adopted in all states by 1959. See
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 932-34. This legislation, ultimately entitled
the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, dealt mainly with the marketing practices of
insurers and had little to say regarding claims practices. The model legislation dealing
with the latter was developed and incorporated into the NAIC Model Unfair Trade
Practices Act by amendment in 1972. See 1 PROCEEDINGS NAVL ASS'N OF INS.
COMMISSIONERS 495-96 (1972). In 1990, the NAIC approved a free-standing act entitled
the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. See 1A PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ASS'N OF
INS. COMMISSIONERS 177-79 (1990). Thus, there are now two separate model acts:
the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Model Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act.
48. Se 4 NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMRS, MODEL IAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES
900-5 to -8 (1992). As of July 1992, only Georgia, Missouri, and Nebraska have adopted
the new free-standing model act. Id.
49. See UNFAIR CLAIMS SETLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 3, reprinted in NATIONAL ASSN OF
INS. COMM'RS MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 900-1, 900-2 (1991).
50. Id. §§ 5-7, at 900-3.
The Tort of Bad Faith
claimants,51 led the courts, with only a very few exceptions, to
refuse to recognize that the legislation created a private cause
of action on behalf of an insured for money damages.5 2 This
was a serious shortcoming.
An individual insured seldom could obtain timely relief by
complaining to the state insurance regulator. Without legal
assistance, it was difficult for an insured to prove a flagrant
and conscious violation of the law or that the insurer engaged
in a general practice of abuse. Only after a large number of
insureds complained against a particular insurer could the
insurance commissioner act. By that time, it was usually too
late for many of the insureds. Consequently, the efforts of the
NAIC proved to be less than adequate for the task. As a result,
many individuals who had been harmed by the wrongful acts
of insurers were still without a remedy even when complaints
were filed with their state insurance commissioner.
In sum, the legislative and administrative responses, either
through provisions for attorneys' fees and penalties or prohibi-
tions on unfair insurer claims practices in general, did not stem
the tide of social pressure for relief from unjustified delays in
processing and arbitrary refusals to pay claims. This left only
one other route open to claimants-the courts. Thus, insureds
increasingly began to turn to private attorneys for assistance.
This in turn caused the courts to take a more critical look at
the claims process and eventually led to a common-law
response under the guise of tort law.
51. The Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, adopted by the NAIC in
1990, contains a "Drafting Note" stating that any jurisdiction choosing to provide a
private cause of action should consider a different statutory scheme, and that the Act
"is inherently inconsistent with a private cause of action." See id. § 1 at 900-1. The
1972 Model Act did not contain such a note.
52. The California Supreme Court initially held that a private cause of action was
created for a single violation under its version of the model legislation, see Royal Globe
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1979), but reversed itself less than
10 years later, see Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58,68-69 (Cal.
1988). The Moradi-Shalal court listed 17 jurisdictions as rejecting the argument that
the model legislation creates a private cause of action. Id. at 63. Montana and West
Virginia have recognized a private cause of action, but only where there are a sufficient
number of violations to constitute a general business practice. See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cumiskey, 665 P.2d 223, 226 (Mont. 1983); Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d
1065, 1068 (Mont. 1983); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 259
(W. Va. 1981); cf. Farmer's Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp.
583, 590 (D.N.D. 1985) (holding that North Dakota's unfair claims practices statute
may create the basis for a private tort action).
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II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE COMMON-LAW TORT OF BAD FAmTH
A. Early Forms of "Liability" Insurance
The origins of the tort of bad faith in first-party insurance
cases are to be found in third-party insurance contracts, that is,
liability insurance. This in itself is interesting because the
earliest forms of "liability" insurance were not what we know
today as third-party insurance.' In fact, they were not liability
insurance policies at all. They were indemnity insurance
contracts, a form of first-party coverage where the insurer only
agreed to reimburse the insured for damages the insured
actually paid to a tort victim. s4 If the insured were not liable,
the insurer owed nothing, just as would be the case if it were
a true liability policy. However, when the insured was liable to
a tort victim but was unable to pay because of insolvency or
some other reason, the insurer still owed nothing, because the
insured had not actually paid money to the victim.5 5 This was
true even though the insurer also had promised to defend the
insured against tort claimants at the insurer's expense. In the
eyes of the law, the insured had not sustained a loss. As a
corollary, the tort victim, not being a party to the contract, had
no remedy against the insurer either.'
In contrast, a real liability policy obligates the insurer to pay
the third-party tort victim once the insured's liability has been
53. The first "liability" insurance policies were purchased by employers as protec-
tion against tort liability to employees resulting from work injuries. KEETON & WIDISS,
supra note 19, § 4.8(a), at 376.
54. VANCE, supra note 43, at 800-01.
55. See, e.g., Cousins v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 98 N.W. 277, 278 (Iowa 1904);
Carter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 91 P. 178, 178-79 (Kan. 1907); Frye v. Bath Gas & Elec.
Co., 54 A. 395, 396 (Me. 1903); Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 84 A. 476, 480 (Md.
1912); Finley v. United States Casualty Co., 83 S.W. 2,4-5 (Tenn. 1904); Ford v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 126 P. 69, 71 (Wash. 1912).
56. This position was buttressed by a "no action" clause in the policy which, for
example, provided: 'No action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under
this policy unless it shall be brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss
actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after a trial of the
issue.'" Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppard, 157 P. 106, 108 (Okla. 1915) (quoting a
common no-action clause).
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established by settlement or court action.57 It is not a
prerequisite that the insured first pay the victim. Although the
first contracts insuring against loss by virtue of payments to a
third-party tort victim were of the indemnity type, eventually
insurers offered policies that protected the insured against
mere liability. However, during the transition from indemnity
to liability contracts, both types of contracts continued to be
treated like any other contract even though the nature of the
relationship between the insured and the insurer was changing.
With regard to the possibility of recovery for consequential
damages, an indemnity contract of insurance was governed by
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale."8 Even though the insurer
agreed to defend the insured, as well to indemnify him for any
damages paid as a result of third-party claims, a breach of
these obligations by the insurer only afforded the insured the
traditional contract measure of damages. The insured could
recover the amount to be indemnified under the policy plus the
costs of defending the third-party action, but nothing more.59
Although this rule held sway throughout most of the twentieth
century, as will be seen below, it eventually was undercut as
liability insurance gradually displaced the indemnity policy as
the standard policy form. This development occurred as a
result of pressure from several fronts.
In the main, the indemnity contract was replaced because the
public was dissatisfied with it. This dissatisfaction, in turn,
resulted in pressure on the courts and the legislatures. As one
authority noted, the indemnity policy and the state of the law
upholding it
57. One court explained, The difference between a contract of indemnity and one
to pay legal liabilities is that upon the former an action cannot be brought, and a
recovery had, until the liability is discharged; whereas upon the latter the cause of
action is complete when the liability attaches." American Employers' Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Fordyce, 36 S.W. 1051, 1053 (Ark. 1896).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
59. The case most often cited for this rule is Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Casualty
& Sur. Co., 184 N.W. 189 (Minn. 1921). There the insured contended that the insurer,
who had wrongfully refused to defend a third-party tort claim, owed not only the policy
limits and costs of defense, but also the amount of the judgment that was in excess of
the policy limits. The court denied the claim for the excess amount, holding that "Itihe
question presented is controlled by the general rule that the measure of damages for
the breach of a contract for the payment of money is the amount agreed to be paid with
interest." Id. at 191.
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permitted grave abuses; furthermore it offends the common
sense of justice to see an insurance company escape
liability merely because the assured was unable to satisfy
the judgment, when the insurer is usually regarded as the
principal debtor within the limits of the policy, and the
assured a mere conduit through whom the money passes.6 °
Consequently, some courts began to construe indemnity policies
so that the insurer could not easily avoid being obligated to pay
the third-party tort victim.6" Under this approach, unless a
policy explicitly and plainly limited the insurer's obligation to
indemnification of what an insured actually paid to the tort
victim, the policy was treated like a liability policy.62 A few
courts also held that the insurer was estopped from denying
any obligation to a third-party claimant once the insurer
assumed control of the defense of its insured, again deviating
from the earlier constructions by courts upholding the terms of
an indemnity policy.'
On another front, state legislatures began to enact "direct
action" statutes that either permitted a tort victim to name
both the tortfeasor and the insurance carrier as defendants in
a personal injury suit or otherwise gave the victim the benefit
of the tortfeasor's insurance policy.' This two-pronged judicial
and legislative attack ultimately caused the insurance industry
to discontinue the issuance of indemnity policies 5 in favor of
60. VANCE, supra note 43, at 802 (footnotes omitted). There were also allegations
that some insurance companies colluded with insureds to secure an adjudication of
bankruptcy for the latter so that the insurer could avoid its obligation under an
indemnity policy. See Merchants Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S.'126, 130
(1925).
61. See VANCE, supra note 43, at 803.
62. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppard, the court held that the policy in question
was a liability policy because it, unlike the policies in the cases relied upon by the
insurer for the proposition it was merely an indemnity policy, did not have a "no action"
clause. 157 P. 106, 108 (Okla. 1915). For an example of a "no action" clause, see supra
note 56.
63. See VANCE, supra note 43, at 802-03.
64. Id. at 803-04.
65. Directors' and officers' liability insurance may provide one of the few examples
of indemnity insurance today in a setting where a covered loss is generated by claims
of third parties against an insured or its officers and directors. There are no standard
forms, but generally the coverage is written two different ways. First, under the
directors and officers insuring clause, the insurer may agree to indemnify the directors
and officers directly for loss they are legally obligated to pay to third parties for which
they are not indemnified by the corporation. This type of coverage may also be written
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the issuance of true liability policies. This development
created, as will be explained below, a different kind of rela-
tionship between an insurer and its insureds under a true
liability policy in comparison with the relationship that was
created between the parties under an indemnity policy. This
difference in the relationship eventually led to the recognition
of a new duty under third-party insurance policies and a
concomitant cause of action against liability insurers.
B. The Change in the Insurer-Insured Relationship
The relationship of the insurer to the insured under in-
demnity insurance did not obligate the insurer to take into
account the interests of the insured. In fact, indemnity
insurance was a form of first-party insurance. As far as the
obligation to indemnify was concerned, the insurer would
either pay or deny the claim of its insured after the
underlying claim against the insured had been concluded. It
was simply a question of whether the insurer was obligated
to pay for a loss sustained by its insured." If a dispute arose
over the obligation to indemnify, it was like any other
dispute between contracting parties.
Even when the insurer had a duty to reimburse defense costs
under an indemnity policy, it did not create any obligation on
the part of the insurer to accept a settlement offer from, much
less any obligation to negotiate a settlement with, a third-party
claimant on behalf of the insured. 7 Such offers and negotia-
tions were the insured's problem. This also was true after
insurers began to provide a defense directly, instead of merely
as true liability insurance, whereby the insurer agrees to pay on behalf of a director or
officer those sums for which he may become liable. Second, under the corporate
reimbursement insuring clause, the subject of insurance is the amount the corporation
is required or permitted to pay as indemnity to the directors and officers for claims
made against them. See generay S.S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
380 (3d ed. 1982).
66. See VANCE, supra note 43, at 800-01.
67. See, e.g., Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 43 A. 503, 505
(Me. 1899); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 140 N.E. 577, 578-79 (N.Y. 1923); C.
Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 90 A. 653, 654 (Pa. 1914).
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reimbursing defense costs incurred by the insured.' The
insurer's obligation with regard to its insured's liability for
damages was still reimbursement of the insured, up to the
policy limits, for sums the insured had been legally obliged
to pay and had in fact paid the claimant.6 9 Essentially, the
courts viewed the indemnity relationship as one where the
insured and insurer dealt with each other at arm's length.7'
It was no different from any other first-party insurance
situation. Liability insurance contracts, however, did not come
to be viewed the same way.
Modern liability policies create a quite different relationship
between the insurer and its insured. Under these contracts,
the insurer not only agrees to defend the insured, but also
agrees to pay any sums within the policy limits that the in-
sured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages to a third-
party claimant and to pay those sums directly to the third
party. 71 There is no requirement that the insured first pay
the damages to the third party. In addition to the obligation
to provide the insured with a defense against third-party
claims, most liability policies include a provision that permits
the insurer to settle any claim within the policy limits.72 This
feature causes the financial destiny of the insured to be much
more dependent on the acts of the insurer. For example, where
a claim is made in excess of the policy limits but the claimant
offers to settle within the limits, it is within the power of the
insurer either to settle and foreclose the insured's exposure
or to refuse to settle and continue the insured's exposure to
the risk of a judgment in excess of the policy limits.7'
68. See majority cases cited in Annotation, Provision Making Actual Payment of
Judgment a Condition of Indemnity Insurer's Liability ("No Action Clause"), as Affected
by Insurer Defending Action Against Insured, 37 A.L.R. 637, 638 (1925).
69. Id.
70. See generally VANCE, supra note 43, at 800-06.
71. Modern liability policies are interpreted to provide that the third-party claimant
may sue on the policy once the liability of the insured is established. See KEETON &
WIDISS, supra note 19, § 4.8(b), at 378.
. 72. Both of these features were initiated under indemnity policies. See, e.g.,
Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 140 N.E. 577,578-79 (N.Y. 1923) (interpreting an
indemnity policy which provided for defense against third-party actions and an option
to settle). Other provisions that evolved from indemnity policies require the insured
to give prompt notice of any claim; to forward immediately any demand, notice, summons
or other process; and to cooperate in any defense or effort at settling the claim. See
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.2.
73. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113,1118-19 (1990).
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This discretion in the insurer, if unchecked, allows the
insurer, at small additional risk to itself because of the policy
limits, to gamble with the insured's money by refusing to
accept or negotiate a settlement within the policy limits. v4 If
acceptance of an offer would ensure savings of only a few
dollars over anyjudgment because the offer was for an amount
close to the policy limits, why not gamble that a jury would
return a verdict for an amount less than the offer? Very little
of the insurer's money would be at stake since its liability was
limited. The insured would have to pay any amount in excess
of the policy limits, not the insurer.
The foregoing scenario is not the only situation where the
insured could find that her insurance protection was not quite
what she might expect. The insured might also be unduly
exposed to the risk of a large excessjudgment even when there
is no offer to settle within the policy limits. For example, if
given the opportunity, the insured might well be willing to pay
some amount in excess of the policy limits from the insured's
own funds to facilitate the settlement of a dangerous case.
In such a case, however, the insurer might refuse to tender
the policy limits because it has nothing to lose by going to trial.
The insured would bear any loss above the policy limits. The
unfairness of such situations was apparent where insurers
claimed unfettered discretion over settlement matters. If this
position were to be sustained, insureds literally would be at
the mercy of the insurers.
The type of situations described above led the courts to
recognize the clear conflict of interests that might occur under
a liability insurance policy. 75 Even though such a policy did
not, by its express terms, impose upon the insurer a duty to
settle claims, courts began to hold that insurers owed a duty
to their insureds to refrain from acting solely on the basis of
their own interests in settlement, rather than considering the
interests of their insureds. 76 This duty was grounded in the
power inherent in the insurer as a result of the relationship
created by a third-party insurance contract.7  As to the
74. See id. at 1128-30.
75. For a description of the different sources ofconflict between insurance companies
and their insureds, see id at 1126-62.
76. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 298 P.2d 1002,1020-24 (Or. 1956).
77. See id. at 1011.
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standard of culpability that accompanied this newfound duty,
some courts couched it in terms of due care on the part of the
insurer.7' Others defined the duty as the exercise of good faith
or, conversely, as the avoidance of bad faith.79 Whatever the
standard for assessing liability, it soon became clear that a
liability insurer could be held responsible for a wrongful failure
to settle. Thus, if tort liability against the insured were found,
the insurer would have to pay the entire judgment, including
any portion in excess of the policy limits.c° Courts were none
too clear at the time as to whether this new basis for liability
rested in contract, tort, or fiduciary obligations ;81 nonetheless,
it made possible the recognition of the tort of bad faith in first-
party situations.
C. The Evolution of the Tort of Bad Faith
in First-Party Insurance
Much of the discussion of the development of the tort of bad
faith centers on a series of decisions by the Supreme Court
of California. Two decisions dealing with liability insurance
were instrumental in bridging the gap from third-party
insurance to first-party insurance and in the eventual recogni-
tion of an entirely new tort. In Cornunale v. Traders &
General Insurance Co., 2 the California Supreme Court
recognized that Hadley v. Baxendale provided the general
common-law rule governing damages for breach of contract
and that a mere wrongful refusal to defend by the insurer
under a liability policy normally would be compensated like
any other breach of contract.' The liability of the insurer
78. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.8(b).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 298 P.2d 1002, 1012-17 (Or. 1956)
(reviewing the various theories upon which an insurer may be held liable for wrongfully
refusing to settle).
82. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
83. See id. at 201. The issue of whether a breach of the duty to defend, as contrasted
with the duty to settle, should give rise to an action for extra-contractual damages under
the tort of bad faith or some other theory has not been addressed by most courts. Since
the Comunale decision, Iowa andNorth Dakota have expressly recognized that the breach
of the duty to defend may constitute a tort and that consequential damages are available
in such cases. See North Iowa State Bank v. AlliedMut. Ins. Co., 471 N.W.2d 824,828-29
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would be limited to the amount of the policy plus attorneys'
fees and costs, even though the judgment was in excess of the
policy limits.' When, however, the insurer not only wrongfully
refused to defend, but, in addition, refused to accept a
reasonable offer of settlement within the policy limits, the
Hadley rule no longer applied. The fact that the insurer was
no longer in a position to entertain the offer because it was
not conducting the defense was of no consequence:
An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk,
and, although its position may not have been entirely
groundless, if the denial is found to be wrongful it is liable
for the full amount which will compensate the insured for
all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach of the
express and implied obligations of the contract. Certainly
an insurer who not only rejected a reasonable offer of
settlement but also wrongfully refused to defend should
be in no better position than if it had assumed the defense
and then declined to settle. The insurer should not be per-
mitted to profit by its own wrong."'
Thus, the insurer was held liable for the excess judgment in
Comunale for having breached its express and implied
obligations under the contract.
Comunale, however, did not provide a definitive break with
Hadley because, arguably, the damages were something that
the parties reasonably could have contemplated at the time
(Iowa 1991); Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751,759 (N.D. 1980).
Oregon, however, has declined to recognize such a tort and remedy. See Farris v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-21 (Or. 1978); cf. Timmons v. Royal
Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 912-13 (Okla. 1982) (holding that a cause of action for
violation of an implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith will not lie against an agent
who is not a party to the insurance contract).
84. The California Supreme Court stated:
In such a case it is reasoned that, if the insured has employed competent counsel
to represent him, there is no ground for concluding that the judgment would have
been for a lesser sum had the defense been conducted by insurer's counsel, and
therefore it cannot be said that the detriment suffered by the insured as the result
of a judgment in excess of the policy limits was proximately caused by the insurer's
refusal to defend.
Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201 (citing Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Casualty & Sur. Co.,
184 N.W. 189 (Minn. 1921)).
85. Id. at 202.
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the policy was issued. Existing insurance practices would
support the proposition that the insured reasonably could
expect that the insurer would accept any reasonable offer
within the policy limits and that this expectation would remain
a reasonable one in the event that the insurer breached its
duty to defend.' In fact, the decision, although very important
in recognizing that the duty to settle was not avoidable by
refusing to defend, did not signal the next crucial development.
The decision revealed little about the other kinds of damages
that might be recovered by the insured, damages that could
not so easily be held to have been within the contemplation
of the parties. For example, what if an insured suffered dam-
ages distinct from those represented by the amount of the
judgment that exceeded the policy limits, that is, damages that
appeared more like tort damages? The answer, based on an
obscure point in Comunale, followed less than ten years later.
The question of whether the insured could recover damages
for emotional distress for an insurer's wrongful failure to settle
was presented to the Supreme Court of California in Crisci
v. Security Insurance Co.87 In Crisci, the insurer had
undertaken the insured's defense, but was adjudged to have
breached its duty of good faith when it failed to settle with the
tort victim.' The insured, however, suffered greater damages
from the breach than the amount of the judgment that
exceeded the policy limits.89 The insured not only sustained
severe economic losses, but her health also seriously deterio-
rated as a result of the financial reverses caused by the in-
surer's breach.' Consequently, the insured sued her liability
insurer for emotional distress, for which she obtained a jury
verdict of $25,000.91 i
In reviewing Crisci, the California Supreme Court pointed
out that Comunale had stated that the duty of good faith in
86. The court in Comunale pointed out that "[i]t [was] common knowledge that a
large percentage of the claims covered by insurance are settled ... and that this is one
of the usual methods by which the insured receives protection." Id. at 201. Thus, an
insured could reasonably expect the insurer to settle an appropriate case even though
the policy did not expressly impose such a duty, even where the insurer was disputing
any duty to defend if the insured believed the insurer was wrong in doing so.
87. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
88. Id- at 177-78.
89. Id at 176.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 178.
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settlement matters sounded in tort as well as in contract,92
a point that the Comunale court in fact had made only in a
brief discussion whether the tort or contract statute of
limitations would apply.93 The Comunale court did not even
hint at, much less discuss, the point that the recognition of
a dual basis for the duty eventually might lead to a broader
measure of damages. Nonetheless, this unexplored aspect of
the Comunale opinion now became the basis for the Crisci
court to hold that tort damages for mental distress were
recoverable against a liability insurer that breached its duty
to settle.' Whereas Comunale could have been considered
somewhat of an exception to Hadley v. Baxendale, Crisci
represented a clear break with the rule that damages for
personal injury were not available for breach of contract. From
this point, it was but a short step, at least for the California
courts, 95 to the recognition of a cause of action in tort against
insurers for failure to pay claims in first-party insurance situa-
tions. Six years later California closed the loop.
In 1973, the Supreme Court of California made the landmark
decision of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.9" In deciding
whether benefits were owed under a fire insurance policy, the
court reiterated the principle that there is an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts of insurance and
reemphasized the rule that a breach of the covenant may give
rise to a cause of action in tort.9 7 Relying heavily on the third-
party cases of Comunale and Crisci, the court stated that the
duty of the insurer to act in good faith and deal fairly when
handling the claim of a third person against the insured and
the duty of an insurer to act in good faith and deal fairly when
handling the claim of an insured in a first-party situation "are
merely two different aspects of the same duty."9" Noting that
the insured had alleged substantial damages for loss of
92. Id.
93. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal. 1958).
94. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179.
95. Not all courts were willing to take that step. See infra note 155.
96. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
97. Id. at 1037. The earlier Court of Appeals case of Fletcher v. Western National
Life Insurance Co. held that a disability insurer could be liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and stated in dicta that the insurer's conduct might also be viewed
as a violation of its implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
93-94 (Ct. App. 1970).
98. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037.
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property in addition to the damages for mental distress, the
Gruenberg court held that a tort measure of damages would
apply and that consequential damages for mental distress, as
well as economic loss, would be available."
With these three decisions, the tort of bad faith was born,
and with it a new era in insurance litigation. To date, well
over one-half of the states, in one form or another, have come
to recognize this break with the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale
in first-party insurance situations."° The amount of litigation
in this area is growing apace as more and more claimants turn
to this new remedy in an effort to force insurers to pay their
claims. Yet aspects of the tort of bad faith remain troublesome
because the courts have not addressed many of the questions
that must be answered when any new common-law cause of
action is created. Moreover, when courts have attempted
answers in many instances, they have not been consistent as
to some of the most basic questions. Thus, insurers today face
a hodgepodge of rationales and rules in this area.
III. STATUS AND IMPACT OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH
AND RELATED ACTIONS
A. Inventorying the Jurisdictions
Although a number ofjurisdictions have recognized a cause
of action for a form of damages beyond the amount owed under
the terms of an insurance policy, the rationales for doing so
have not been entirely consistent. During the two decades
since the Supreme Court of California decision in Gruenberg
v. Aetna Insurance Co., at least twenty-three other courts of
last resort have held that an insurer may be liable to an
insured for consequential or punitive damages under a tort
theory, most often referred to as the tort of bad faith:
99. Id. at 1040-42.
100. See infra notes 101-32 and accompanying text.
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Alabama, 01 Alaska, 102 Arizona,10 3 Arkansas,"M Colorado, 10 5
Connecticut, 0 6 Idaho,'1 7 Iowa,' Kentucky,0 9 Mississippi,"0
Montana, i l' Nebraska, 112 Nevada,113 New Mexico,1 4 North
Dakota,"5 Ohio, 116 Oklahoma, 117 Rhode Island,"' South Caro-
lina,"9 South Dakota, 120 Texas, 12' Wisconsin,' and Wyoming.123
101. Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981).
102. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (Alaska
1989).
103. Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867-68 (Ariz. 1981).
104. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463,465 (Ark.
1984).
105. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1267-71 (Colo. 1985).
106. Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 530 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1987).
107. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1017-20 (Idaho 1986).
108. Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988).
109. Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Ky. 1989).
110. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simpson, 477 So. 2d 242, 248-52 (Miss.
1985).
111. Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970, 977 (Mont. 1982).
112. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 772-76 (Neb. 1991).
113. United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 780 P.2d 193, 197 (Nev. 1989).
114. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 527 P.2d 798, 800 (N.M. 1974).
115. Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638,
643 (N.D. 1979).
116. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ohio 1983).
117. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899,904-05 (Okla. 1978).
118. Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980). In 1978, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court rejected a cause of action for first-party bad faith in a case
involving a fire insurance policy because the terms of the policy, as is the case with most
fire policies in the United States, had been prescribed by legislation. A.A.A. Pool Serv.
& Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 A.2d 724,725-26 (R.I. 1978). The court
reasonedthat it was forthe legislature to provide any extra-contractual remedies in such
cases. Id. at 726. Two years later, in Bibeault, the court limited the application ofA.A.A.
Pool Service to fire policies and recognized the tort of bad faith in a case dealing with
uninsured motorist coverage, another legislatively prescribed form of coverage. See 417
A.2d at 317.
In 1981, however, the Rhode Island legislature extended the cause of action for bad
faith to all insurance contracts. Act ofMay 20, 1981, ch. 235, § 1, 1981 R.I. Pub. Laws
966. The statute creates a private cause of action for "compensatory damages, punitive
damages and reasonable attorney fees" under any insurance policy where the insurer
"wrongfully and in bad faith refused to pay or settle a claim made pursuant to the
provisions of said policy, or otherwise wrongfully and in bad faith refused to timely
perform its obligations under said contract ofinsurance." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (1985).
119. Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C. 1983).
120. In re Certification of a Question of Law, 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987).
121. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
122. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Wis. 1978).
123. McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 856-60 (Wyo. 1990).
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A few federal courts and inferior state courts also have
recognized such a cause of action."
In contrast, the highest courts of Indiana,25 New Hamp-
shire, 126 Utah,127 and West Virginia'2 have recognized the right
to recover damages beyond the policy benefits under some
expanded version of the rules prescribing damages for breach
of contract. Although the first three jurisdictions mentioned
have refused to ground the new remedies against insurers in
124. See Justin v. Guardian Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. 614,616 (D.V.I. 1987); Washington
v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C. 1984); Phillips v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984,989 (D. Vt. 1979); Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 331
S.E.2d 148, 153-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 336 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. 1985).
The Illinois appellate courts have split on whether to recognize the tort of bad faith in
first-party insurance contracts. Compare Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care,
330 N.E.2d 540, 548 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (recognizing the tort of bad faith), rev'd on other
grounds, 356 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 1976) with Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 371 N.E.2d 373,
376-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (refusing to recognize a tort remedy because a statute already
allowed the recovery of attorneys' fees when an insurer's refusal to pay was 'vexatious
and without reasonable cause").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit originally predicted that
the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize the insurer's duty to act in good faith
and to deal fairly in the settlement of claims, and that such a duty supports a claim for
consequential damages. See Polite v. Continental Casualty Co., 689 F.2d 457, 463 (3d
Cir. 1982). This position, until recently, was consistently repudiated by the New Jersey
Appellate Division. See Wine Imports, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co.,
708 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing New Jersey Appellate Division cases). In
1991, however, the New Jersey Appellate Division, while acknowledging that there was
no cause of action for "emotional or physical distress" or for punitive damages for an
insurer's wrongful denial of a claim, held that there was a cause of action for economic
consequential damages in an action for bad-faith refusal to process and pay an insurance
claim when these damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was
entered. Pickett v. Lloyds, 600 A.2d 148, 152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert.
granted, 606 A.2d 373 (1992); see also Haardt v. Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp.
804, 810-11 (D.N.J. 1992) (following Pickett v. Lloyds).
125. Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976)
(recognizing that punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract under special
circumstances); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parkinson, 487 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing that compensatory damages for economic losses caused by
insurer's unjustified delay in settling a first-party claim may be recovered).
126. Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581-82 (N.H. 1978) (recognizing
that compensatory damages for economic losses, but not for emotional distress, caused
by insurer's unjustified delay in settling first-party claim may be recovered); see also
Drop AnchorRealtyTrustv. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 339,344 (N.H. 1985) (award-
ing attorneys' fees to an insured for the insurer's wrongful refusal to settle first-party
claim).
127. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that
consequential damages for economic loss and emotional distress, as well as attorneys'
fees, are recoverable for an insurer's wrongful refusal to settle a first-party claim).
128. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73,80 (W. Va. 1986)
(recognizing the right to attorneys' fees and consequential damages for net economic loss
and aggravation and inconvenience when an insured substantially prevails against a
property insurer, as well as punitive damages where the insurer knew that the insured's
claim was proper, but willfully, maliciously, and intentionally denied the claim).
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tort, they have required proof of wrongful conduct on the part
of the insurer for recovery of consequential damages."2 This
conduct is very similar, if not identical, to that required by
some courts for the tort of bad faith. West Virginia, on the
other hand, appears to employ a test that can only be described
as strict liability."
Florida also recognizes extra-contractual damages, but it
has created a private cause of action by statute13 1 under which
129. See supra notes 125-27. The fact thatthe tort ofbadfaith was rejected, however,
has left these courts with the task of articulating a standard of culpability that would
justify the extra-contractual damages. Thus far, that standard is none too clear.
130. West Virginia rejected the concepts of "good faith" and "bad faith," along with
the concepts of "reasonable," "unreasonable," and "wrongful," in enunciating a test for
liability for economic loss and aggravation and inconvenience. See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d
at 80. The test, which could be one of strict liability where the insurer took a reasonable,
but ultimately incorrect, position in denying a claim, is simply a question of whether
the insured "substantially prevails" in a suit against a property insurer. Id-
131. The Florida statute states, in pertinent part:
(1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person
is damaged:
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circum-
stances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward
its insured and with due regard for his interests;
2. Making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by
a statement setting forth the coverage under which payments are being made; or
3. Except as to liability coverages, failing to promptly settle claims, when the
obligation to settle a claim has become reasonably clear, under one portion of the
insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions
of the insurance policy coverage.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the above to the contrary, a person pursuing
a remedy under this section need not prove that such act was committed or
performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.
(3) Upon adverse adjudication at trial or upon appeal, the insurer shall be
liable fordamages, togetherwith court costs andreasonable attorney's fees incurred
by the plaintiff.
(4) No punitive damages shall be awarded under this section unless the acts
giving rise to the violation occur with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice and these acts are:
(a) Willful, wanton, and malicious;
(b) In reckless disregard for the rights of any insured; or
(c) In reckless disregard for the rights of a beneficiary under a life insurance
contract.
Any person who pursues a claim under this subsection shall post in advance the
costs of discovery. Such costs shall be awarded to the insurer if no punitive
damages are awarded to the plaintiff.
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insurers may be held liable for bad faith in dealing with claims
of their insureds.1,3 2  Thus, in twenty-nine states in this
country, insurers are now faced with the prospect of a suit for
extra-contractual damages every time they fail to pay the
claims of their insureds fully and in a timely manner. In fact,
counts containing such claims are included so routinely in
lawsuits against insurance companies that one has to wonder
if the claims practices of insurers in fact have deteriorated so
badly. Common sense would question such a proposition and,
at the very least, calls for closer scrutiny of these new causes
of action.
B. Are Insurers That Bad?
There is no doubt that insurers do treat individual insureds
badly on occasion, and every so often a particular insurer may
even engage in a general practice of unfair treatment.'33
(7) The civil remedy specified in this section does not preempt any other
remedy or cause of action provided for pursuant to any other statute or pursuant
to the common law of this state. Any person may obtain a judgment under either
the common law remedy of bad faith or this statutory remedy, but shall not be
entitled to a judgment under both remedies. This section shall not be construed
to create a common law cause of action. The damages recoverable pursuant to this
section shall include those damages which are a reasonably foreseeable result of
a specified violation of this section by the insurer and may include an award or
judgment in an amount that exceeds the policy limits.
FLA. STAT. ch. 624.155 (Supp. 1991).
Although subsection (7) of the Florida statute permits an insured to resort to the
common law remedy of bad faith," the Supreme Court of Florida has never recognized
such a cause of action, nor have the lower courts. See Opperman v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 263, 265-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 523 So. 2d
578 (Fla. 1988).
132. Rhode Island is the only other state to codify a cause of action for bad faith.
See supra note 118.
133. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073,1083-85 (Ariz.) (upholding
$15,000 compensatory and $3.5 million punitive damages awards where evidence
supported the conclusion that the insurer engaged in a general practice of routine,
automatic deductions, regardless of their validity, in valuing insureds' losses under auto
collision coverage), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874 (1987); Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d
790,791-93 (Nev. 1991) (upholding a $410,000 compensatory award but reducing a $22.5
million punitive award to $5 million where the insurer made it a practice, particularly
with regard to lower- and middle-income policyholders who are less likely to dispute the
insurer's position, to offer to settle claims for amounts substantially below their true
value and then by delay, harassment, and intimidation force claimants to accept settle-
ment for amounts less than what was actually due). Such cases represent the exception,
however, rather than the rule. In reviewing all of the first-party bad-faith decisions by
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Although such practices by insurers do occur, they are by no
means limited to insurers. On the contrary, they seem to be
inherent in any large institution. Government agencies, as
well as private corporations, are largely bureaucracies, and
bureaucracies by nature fail to take into account individual
needs. In an attempt to administer the functions of a large
and complex enterprise systematically, be it government or
private, there is a need for organization which, in turn, leads
to divisions having specialized functions and actions dictated
by fixed rules under a hierarchy of authority. That kind of
organization often lacks the flexibility needed for attention
to unique individual needs. Without such attention, there are
opportunities for mistreatment of individuals without and
within the organization.
Insurance companies are no exception when it comes to their
insureds. In an attempt to be efficient, claims are handled
on a mass-production basis. This type of claims process
inevitably leads to errors, but it does not mean that every
incorrect denial is the result of bad faith. In fact, very few
fit in this category if by bad faith one means that the insurer
has acted in a completely capricious or, in the language of the
model unfair claims practices legislation developed by the
NAIC, a flagrant and conscious manner. 13 Nevertheless, even
though abuses may be a predictable and even an understand-
able phenomenon, they do not have to be tolerated, especially
when the public interest is affected seriously. The question,
rather, is how to minimize the mistreatment most efficaciously.
After all, the insureds ultimately are paying the freight.
C. Undue Exposure Can Be Debilitating
In the context of insurance claims practices, it is clear that
some measures were needed to redress the legitimate
the courts of last resort in this country, I found that the overwhelming majority of cases
involved allegations of isolated conduct rather than any practice or pattern by a particular
insurer, much less by the insurance industry as a whole. As noted previously, this is
one of the reasons why the unfair claims practice legislation adopted by most states failed
to provide adequate remedies to the individual insured. See supra text accompanying
notes 47-52.
134. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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complaints of insureds, but now it appears that the balance
may have been tipped too far in their favor by unduly exposing
insurers to extra-contractual damages. The judicial filling of
the vacuum left by the legislative and administrative processes
was justified when it was made; real abuses by insurers need
to be identified and corrected. Nevertheless, the new tort
remedy, although necessary in some form, now shows signs
of being too oppressive on an industry whose financial vitality
and efficiency are essential to social well-being. Multimillion
dollar awards for wrongfully denying claims not only are
unnecessary to correct the situation, but such awards, which
often have a windfall nature,1 35 may raise the cost of insurance
for the vast numbers of insureds who are not mistreated and
may do great harm to the risk-transfer-and-distribution
mechanism in our society by making insurance so expensive
that it can no longer be purchased like a household commodity.
There is a point at which potential insureds will either elect
reduced coverage or forgo purchases or other activities because
of insurance costs. This negative impact certainly could extend
to and affect the standard of living for individuals if too much
of their income must be spent on premiums that spread the
costs of awards for extra-contractual damages and the related
expenses of defending against such claims, in addition to
covering the primary risks insured against. On a larger scale,
it could negate that which may otherwise be economically and
socially achievable in this country, particularly if the punitive
awards are not better regulated.
There is a delicate balance in the interdependent relation-
ship between risk distribution and the economic development
of any society."3 If the relationship becomes unbalanced in
either direction, it could retard economic development. When
insurance costs absorb a disproportionate amount of the gross
national product, particularly when a substantial part of that
cost goes to pay for noneconomic consequential harm and
135. Very frequently bad-faith awards contain punitive damages that are many times
the amount of compensatory damages. See, e.g., Eichenseerv. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934
F.2d 1377, 1380, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991) (awarding $1000 in compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages); Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 806 P.2d 1342,
1344 (Cal. 1991) (awarding $16,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive
damages). Although there are sound policy reasons for awarding some amount of punitive
damages, it still must be recognized that such damages do not compensate any loss and
that some insureds are made wealthy quite fortuitously.
136. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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punitive awards as contrasted to losses against which the
insurance was purchased, the cost of spreading loss may
hinder, rather than facilitate, economic development. This
arrested development will adversely affect the ability to
achieve social goals. Thus, a proper balance must be struck
between the interests of insureds and insurers.
Achieving that balance through the common-law development
of the tort of bad faith has not been completely satisfactory.
The common-law process is, at best, fitful; and there is no
guarantee that the courts will develop a definitive and timely
answer to the problems. The issues must be recognized first
and then properly framed at the trial level. Even when the
issues are preserved properly, there is no assurance that they
will be resolved on appeal. As to appellate resolutions, so
much depends on the participants and their abilities to define
the issues and to articulate clear solutions. Moreover, the
judicial process of common-law decision making is not designed
to develop all the information necessary to make informed
choices as to the proper solution to a perceived problem. The
legislative process is often the best vehicle. Thus, judges
cannot and should not do it all. Largely because of the
unpredictability of and the inherent limitations on the judicial
process, the new causes of action have proven to be a relatively
crude and oppressive remedy for a situation that requires the
interests at stake to be balanced more delicately, and to be
balanced the same way throughout the United States. At the
very least, there is definitely room for improvement, parti-
cularly with regard to the standard of culpability and the
available remedies.
IV. THE STANDARD OF CULPABILITY
A. What Constitutes "Bad Faith"?
In their attempts to impose new obligations in the relation-
ships established by an insurance contract, the courts seized
on the basic principle that there is a duty of good faith and
fair dealing arising from every contract. 137 In the context of
137. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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insurance contracts, neither the insured nor the insurer is to
do anything to prevent the other from receiving the benefit
of his bargain." This principle obviously influenced the label
given by most courts to the new cause of action, the "tort of
bad faith." The term "bad faith," however, is not self-defining,
nor has it historically been a recognized, independent basis
of culpability in tort law. It has come to mean different things
to different courts.1" Consequently, its use has caused
definitional problems from the outset.
Early on, in the attempt to define the duty of a liability
insurer to settle claims against its insureds, courts struggled
to articulate the appropriate standard of culpability when the
insurer was alleged to have breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing.140 Did the cause of action require a conscious dis-
regard of the insured's interests, or did it only require a failure
of the insurer to exercise due care in the settlement process?
141
Was "bad faith" just the converse of "good faith" or did the
former involve a different standard?142 Did the standard
encompass both a duty to exercise due care, an objective
standard, and a duty to act in good faith, a subjective stan-
dard?143 Did "bad faith" mean that the insured had to prove
the insurer acted maliciously or from evil motives?'" All of
these issues were raised in the context of third-party insurance
situations, but there were no definitive answers.
B. The Third-Party Cases
A number of courts, in the course of addressing third-party
insurance issues, concluded that the standard had to be
138. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Cal. 1958).
139. See Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413,414 (Wis. 1931) (discussing
the duty of good faith that an insurer owes to an insured).
140. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198,200-01 (Cal. 1958); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 319 P.2d
69, 75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Eastham v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 540 P.2d 364, 367
(Or. 1975), reh'g denied, 542 P.2d 895 (Or. 1975); see also Robert E. Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1139-48 (1954)
(discussing various standards used to define the duty to settle).
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defined by reference to the fact that the relationship between
the insured and insurer under a liability policy may be viewed
as fiduciary in nature."4 5 Nonetheless, this conclusion did not
lead to agreement among the courts that the test for liability
should be framed in traditional terms. The decision whether
the liability insurer did or did not have a duty to defend
typically required only answering a relatively simple question
of contract law: Did the alleged facts upon which the third-
party claim was based fall within the coverage provided to the
insured?4 6
In comparison, the decision whether the insurer should have
settled the claim against its insured required more complex
work. The latter required an evaluation of how the insurer
should have acted. Even after the facts were found as to how
the insurer did act, there still had to be some judgment
regarding the decision of the insurer whether or not to settle
the claim against its insured, a decision that involved such
imponderables as what the trier of fact might decide as to the
merits of the claim if the case were not settled. This decision,
usually to be rendered by a jury of laypersons, quite often
would involve the issue of liability as well as that for damages.
How should the insurer's prediction regarding the resolution
of these issues be reviewed once a verdict was in fact rendered
that exceeded the policy limits? Was the test to be one of
whether the insurer honestly believed there would be a very
small risk that the jury would find the insured to be liable or
that, even if found liable, the risk of a verdict in excess of the
policy limit was remote? Or was the test to be what an
ordinarily prudent liability insurer would have done under the
circumstances? The former involved a factual inquiry alone
while the latter required that the facts, once found, be
compared with a norm. The test to be selected was not self-
evident, nor could it have been because the duty had a
schizophrenic quality to it.
Resolution of the issue seemed to be stymied by the fact that
the new duty arose out of a contractual relationship, the
145. See, e.g., Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984).
146. Some courts have given a broader interpretation to the duty to defend, including
situations where the insurer is aware of facts that may give rise to coverage even though
not pled by the third-party claimant. See, e.g., Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos.,
278 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 1979); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 575
N.E.2d 90, 92-94 (N.Y. 1991).
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breach of which usually is not determined by any standard of
culpability. Yet the court had to select a standard by which
the duty to settle could be judged, a duty that called both for
good faith and fair dealing. 4 7 The duty seemed to call for two
inconsistent tests: (1) an evaluation of the insurer's conduct
in comparison with some norm in order to determine whether
the insurer had dealt with the insured fairly; and (2) a deter-
mination whether the insurer honestly believed that what it
was doing was the correct thing to do. A normative standard
is, in effect, an objective standard and is inconsistent with the
possibility of framing the issue in terms of whether the insurer
had acted in an honest belief, that is, in good faith. Good faith
is a subjective standard that involves a test of what the actor
knew and thought and does not require any comparison with
a norm. Thus, good faith is more consistent with a test that
inquires whether the harm to the insured has been caused
intentionally or recklessly, whereas a test of fair dealing is
more consistent with the use of a standard such as that for
negligence. The courts could have opted for a subjective test
that would have made the breach of the duty to settle an
intentional or reckless tort, or they might have chosen an
objective test that would have made the breach a negligence-
based tort. They did neither. 4 '
Rather than employing these more orthodox tort terms ex-
clusively, the courts also talked about the amount of consider-
ation the insurer should give to the insured's interests,'49
injecting notions of loyalty that arose from the fiduciary
aspects of the relationship. Viewing the relationship as
fiduciary in nature may have obfuscated, if not confounded,
the resolution in tort terms. It was obvious that both the in-
surer and the insured had legitimate interests in the
147. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Cal. 1958)
(holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that arises in every
contract requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case even though the express
terms of the policy do not impose such a duty).
148. Although two courts have discussed the possibility of adopting a standard of
strict liability where an excess verdict is returned after a liability insurer fails to accept
a settlement offer, such a standard has yet to be adopted. See Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.,
323 A.2d 495, 510 (N.J. 1974).
149. Most courts have held that the insurer must give equal consideration to the
insured's interests in deciding whether to accept a settlement offer. A few have held
that the insurer must give greater consideration to the insured's interests than it gives
to its own. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.8(b)(2).
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settlement question. Just as obviously, their interests did not
necessarily lead to the same answer."W The imposition of a
requirement that the insurer demonstrate greater fidelity to
the interests of the insured than to its own interests, a
requirement traditionally imposed on a fiduciary,' appeared
to be the imposition of a duty to settle in any case where there
was any appreciable risk of an excess judgment. A settlement
would be required even when the risk was very low that the
claimant would win at all or that there would be an excess
judgment even if the claimant won. Thus, imposition of the
traditional obligations of a fiduciary would deny to the insurer
the ability to look after its own interests, which included the
interests of all of its insureds. The particular insured's
interest would be paramount, necessitating a settlement unless
the third-party claim was clearly groundless.
The courts were not prepared to take the fiduciary theory
so far and the resulting tension may have led some courts to
speak simultaneously of requirements of good faith and of due
care. 15 2 The articulation of both a subjective and an objective
standard, inconsistent as they may be, seemed to be a way of
confirming that the insurer did not owe complete fidelity to
its insured to the exclusion of any concern for its own inter-
ests. 1" On the other hand, many courts were not convinced
that a pure tort analysis produced the appropriate balance
between the parties given the position of control of the
litigation by a liability insurer."M In any event, this was the
state of the law defining a liability insurer's duty to settle
third-party claims that provided the backdrop against which
the courts were to recognize a cause of action for "bad faith"
in first-party situations.
150. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
151. See 2AAUSTIN W. ScoTr&WInLLAMF. FRATCHEP, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170(4th
ed. 1987).
152. See, e.g., Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 89 (Kan. 1990).
153. For example, in Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co.,
the court acknowledged that in the past it had used the terms "good faith," 'bad faith,"
and "due care" in defining a liability insurer's duty regarding settlements, but now said
that to do so tends to inject an inappropriate subjective element-the insurer's state of
mind-into the formula. See 693 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Or. 1985). The court went on to hold
that the insurer's duty is best expressed by an objective test, namely, whether the insurer
exercised due care under the circumstances. See id.
154. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.8(b).
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Yet even though the third-party decisions were relied on to
recognize a new cause of action in first-party cases, they were
of little help in defining the duty in first-party cases. The
relationship between the insurer and insured in the latter
cases did not involve the power of the insurer to control the
third-party tort litigation and did not evoke any notions of
fiduciary obligations. Thus, there was no occasion to talk in
terms of giving equal consideration to the interests of the
insured. By hindsight, the third-party cases provided a poor
analogy for recognizing a tort duty in first-party cases 55 and
it is no wonder that they were of little assistance in developing
the standard of culpability for the new cause of action. In fact,
the two types of relationships were not "merely two different
aspects of the same duty.""
C. The First-Party Cases
The standard for determining liability in the early first-party
cases once again was expressed in terms of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing, 5 7 just as in the original third-party cases.
Although the breach of the duty in first-party cases was
characterized ambiguously as an act of "bad faith," the early
decisions talked more in terms of requiring conscious
wrongdoing by an insurer." s The refusal to pay a claim in the
face of insurer knowledge that there was no reasonable basis
for doing so was the paradigm situation. There was no doubt
that when the insurer acted in such an unjustifiable manner,
155. Some courts have refused to recognize the tort of bad faith in first-party cases,
at least in part, because the first-party insurance relationship does not give rise to a
fiduciary obligation on the party of the insurer. See Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co.,
392 A.2d 576, 580 (N.H. 1978); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d
1015, 1019 (Or. 1978). But cf. Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 496
A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985) (recognizing that consequential economic loss and attorneys' fees
may be recovered in first-party cases for breach of contract).
156. See supra text accompanying note 98.
157. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973) (relying on
third-party cases).
158. See id. at 1038; Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375
A.2d 428, 429 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care,
330 NE.2d 540,546 (111. App. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 356 N.E.2d 75 (111. 1976); State
Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 527 P.2d 798,800 (N.M. 1974); Christian v. American Home
Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978).
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that is, with actual knowledge of no reasonable basis for
refusal, the new cause of action incorporated a subjective test
that would fit comfortably within the orthodox definition of
an intentional tort.'59 If limited to such circumstances, the
tort of bad faith in first-party situations would have been a
less formidable development in the law and certainly not as
devastating to the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. The cases did
not follow this path, however. It was not long before the term
"bad faith" was employed to mean something more, raising
serious questions as to exactly what conduct was included in
the meaning of the term.
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Anderson
v. Continental Insurance Co.' 60 and took the lead in the area
by articulating a detailed standard of culpability. Although
the Wisconsin court specifically referred to the new cause of
action as an intentional tort,'' the opinion appeared to go
beyond the orthodox definition of intent16 2 as it sought to
delineate the standard of culpability for the new tort:
159. The second Restatement of Torts provides, "he word 'intent' is used throughout
the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). The drafters explained:
a. "Intent," as it is used throughout the Restatement of Torts, has reference
to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself. When an actor fires a gun
in the midst of the Mojave Desert, he intends to pull the trigger; but when the
bullet hits a person who is present in the desert without the actor's knowledge,
he does not intend that result. "Intent" is limited, wherever it is used, to the
consequences of the act.
b. All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended, as the
word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not, however, limited to consequences
which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or sub-
stantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the
law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. As the probability that the
consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty,
the actor's conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness,
as defined in § 500. As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a..
risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence, as defined in § 282.
All three have their important place in the law of torts, but the liability attached
to them will differ.
I& cmts. a, b.
160. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
161. Id. at 376.
162. See supra note 159.
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To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the
absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the
policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard
of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.
It is apparent, then, that the tort of bad faith is an inten-
tional one. "Bad faith" by definition cannot be uninten-
tional ....
While we have stated above that, for proof of bad faith,
there must be an absence of a reasonable basis for denial
of policy benefits and the knowledge or reckless disregard
of a reasonable basis for a denial, implicit in that test is
our conclusion that the knowledge of the lack of a reason-
able basis may be inferred and imputed to an insurance
company where there is a reckless disregard of a lack of
a reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to
facts or to proofs submitted by the insured.
Under these tests of the tort of bad faith, an insurance
company, however, may challenge claims which are fairly
debatable and will be found liable only where it has
intentionally denied (or failed to process or pay) a claim
without a reasonable basis."6
This formulation has proved to be the most complete by any
court to date and a number of jurisdictions have followed it
in first-party insurance cases. Nonetheless, not all courts have
seen fit to embrace it.
Of the twenty-nine jurisdictions that now permit extra-
contractual damages in first-party insurance cases on some
basis akin to the tort of bad faith,' ten purport to follow the
Anderson test.1"5 These courts have not indicated that they
are willing to embrace any standard of culpability other than
163. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376-77.
164. See supra notes 101-131.
165. See GulfAtl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d916, 924 (Ala. 1981); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1154 n.3 (Alaska 1989) (approving a
jury instruction using, inter alia, "reckless indifference" to the interests or rights of an
insured); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1274 (Colo. 1985); Curry v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176,178 (Ky. 1989) (adoptingthe dissenting opinion in Federal
Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Ky. 1986), which argued for
adoption of the Anderson test); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 778 (Neb.
1991); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 590 N.E.2d 1228, 1235-36 (Ohio 1992); Bibeault
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980); In re Certification of Question of Law,
399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987); Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co., 347 N.W.2d 595, 600-01
(Wis. 1984); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1990).
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intentional or reckless conduct. On the other hand, two other
jurisdictions have expanded the basis of culpability to include
gross negligence,"' and as many as three others may have
extended the tort to encompass negligent conduct.6 7 One
jurisdiction appears even to have adopted strict liability as
the test, albeit on a theory of breach of contract.16 The courts
166. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830,832 (Miss. 1986); Jessen
v. National Excess Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1247 (N.M. 1989).
167. South Carolina has held that "the jury is entitled to consider negligence on the
issue of unreasonable refusal to pay benefits." Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 306 S.E.2d 616,620 (S.C. 1983). In addition, Iowa and Texas may permit negligent
conduct to suffice for a bad-faith claim.
In Kiner v. Reliance Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Iowa was asked to pass
judgment on an instruction that require d the jury to find that the insurer "knew or should
have known there was not a reasonable basis for denying payment" as the test for bad
faith. 463 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1990) (emphasis omitted). The insurer argued that under
Iowa law the plaintiffwas required to prove that the insurerknew or recklessly disregard-
ed the fact that there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim and that this involves
an element of intent which was lacking in the instruction. Id. In a somewhat confusing
opinion, the court first said that in the context of bad-faith claims that "reckless
disregard" would exist if an insurer knows or has reason to know that it has no basis
for denying the claim but does so anyway. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 500 (1965)). Then the court intimated that this standard for "reckless disregard" was
somehow different from that employed in Anderson and that "reckless disregard" in the
latter sense was not a necessary element in a bad-faith claim. See id. at 13. The court
since has stated that the Kiner decision modified the second part of the Anderson test.
See Reuterv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 250,253 (Iowa 1991). However,
it is not clear how Kiner differs from Anderson in practice.
Kiner would appear to adopt the Restatement definition of "reckless," which requires
the actor to know or"have reason to know" that there is a great risk that harm will ensue
from her conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). However, the Kiner
court cited the Texas Supreme Court case of Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America
in support of its holding that the Iowa jury instruction correctly stated the law in that
the test used there was substantially the same as that approved in the Texas case. See
463 N.W.2d at 13 (citing Aranda v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988)).
In Aranda, the Texas court held that the insured must prove that the insurer "knew
or should have known" that there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim. 748
S.W.2d at 213.
The Restatement draws a distinction between "having reason to know" and "should
know," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1965), and uses only the former to define
"reckless," reserving the latter for lesser forms of culpability such as negligence, see id.
§ 500 & cmts. In any event, if Iowa and Texas permit a finding of bad faith on the basis
that the insurer "should have known" that there was no reasonable basis for denying
the claim, they are employing a negligence standard. For more discussion on the dif-
ference between reckless and negligent conduct, see infra text accompanying notes 175-79.
168. The Supreme Court of West Virginia has stated: L
It is now the majority rule in American courts that when an insurer wrongfully
withholds or unreasonably delays payment of an insured's claim, the insurer is
liable for all foreseeable, consequential damages naturally flowing from the delay.
Unfortunately, awards of consequential damages currently turn on judicial inter-
pretation of such malleable and easily manipulated concepts as "reasonable,"
"unreasonable," "wrongful," "good faith" and "bad faith." We believe that the
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in the remaining thirteen jurisdictions169 have not indicated
clearly whether they will go beyond some test akin to that for
an intentional tort and, if so, whether they will stop at the
perimeters ofAnderson. Moreover, as will be discussed below,
on close examination the perimeters of Anderson are not all
that well defined. Even if more courts were to follow the
Wisconsin decision, there is still a great deal of work to be
done on the definition of "bad faith."
D. Defining the Levels of Culpability
Although the Anderson definition of the standard of culp-
ability for the tort of bad faith has garnered the most support,
it is not as clear as it might be. At best, the test is ambiguous
as to its inclusion of reckless conduct; moreover, it is unclear
what the court means when it says that intent may be inferred
interests of both the parties and the judicial system would be better served by the
enunciation of a clear, bright line standard governing the availability of con-
sequential damages in property damages insurance cases. Accordingly, we hold
today that when a policyholder substantially prevails in a property damage suit
against an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to damages for net economic loss
caused by the delay in settlement, as well as an award for aggravation and
inconvenience.
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73,80 (W. Va. 1986) (citation
omitted).
169. Of the remaining thirteen jurisdictions, Indiana, New Hampshire, and Utah
have rejected tort as the basis for consequential damages in bad faith cases. See supra
text accompanying notes 125-127. At present they have required some type of conscious
wrongdoing, even though the cause of action is based on a breach of contract theory.
It remains to be seen whether they will follow the lead of West Virginia in eventually
applying a test of strict liability. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
Florida has a statutory right to recover that appears to employ strict liability for failure
to provide a statement setting forth the coverage under which payments are being made,
but may have limited other claims to conscious wrongdoing. See supra note 131.
At one point, Arizona expressly reserved the question ofwhether negligence will suffice
and was conspicuously ambiguous on the issue of whether reckless conduct will support
a cause of action for bad faith. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986).
However, as this Article was in press, the Arizona Supreme Court, in summarizing its
prior decisions on the subject, stated that the tort of bad faith could not be proven by
showing mere negligence, but that it required proof that the insurer knew its conduct
was unreasonable or acted so recklessly that such knowledge could be imputed to it.
See Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1265, 1268-69 (Ariz. 1992).
The other eight states-Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma-have not indicated whether they will follow Anderson
or develop a different basis for liability for the tort of bad faith in first-party insurance
cases.
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from such conduct."0 At worst, the Anderson test may lead
to an unwarranted expansion of the tort of bad faith beyond
intentional or reckless conduct because of the court's failure
to apply orthodox tort definitions of culpability. In my view,
clarification is needed, and there is no better way to begin this
task than with a review of the American Law Institute's efforts
to summarize American common law through the various
Restatements.
The second Restatement of Torts classifies the various types
of culpable conduct, distinguishing among them on the basis
of cognition. The degree to which the actor appreciates or
understands that harm will or may result from his conduct
determines the classification of the conduct as intentional,
reckless, or merely negligent. 7' The classification of inten-
tional torts, the most egregious conduct, 7 2 is limited to that
conduct in which the actor has actual knowledge or knows with
substantial certainty that his conduct will result in harm to
another. 173 When this test is set beside that of the next level
ofegregiousness-recklessness' 4-the ambiguity inAnderson
becomes apparent.
The Restatement defines a "reckless" actor as one who knows
or has reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable
person to realize not just that his conduct creates an unreason-
able risk of harm to another, but that his conduct is highly
likely to result in the harm.7 5 Without these elements, the
170. This is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court of Iowa apparently reads
the Anderson test for reckless conduct as different from the definition found in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. See supra note 167.
171. See supra note 159.
172. The second Restatement ofTorts makes a distinction between intent and motive,
i.e., the reason why a person so acted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 44 (1965).
A bad motive or reason for the conduct in question may affect the damages to be awarded,
but, as a general proposition, it is not a required element of most intentional torts. There
are exceptions though, such as for malicious prosecution. See id. § 653 (1977).
173. See supra note 159.
174. The term "reckless" is usually expressed as part of the phrase "willful, wanton
and reckless," but today each term is considered to mean the same thing. W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984). The second
Restatement of Torts uses the one term "reckless" in lieu of the three. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, Special Note (1965).
175. The Restatement provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing
or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize,
not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another,
but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.
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conduct can be no more than negligent."' This definition
encompasses two different states of mind. First, when a
person acts, or fails to act, with awareness177 of the high degree
of risk, the conduct is reckless.' 78 Second, when a person acts
with awareness of the facts which give rise to the risk, but is
not aware of the high degree of risk involved, that conduct still
is considered reckless if a reasonable person in his or her place
would be aware of such risk.1 79 According to the Restatement,
the essential difference between intentional and reckless
conduct lies in the level of the actor's knowledge of the degree
of certainty that consequences will flow from the actor's
conduct.18° Both intentional and reckless conduct involve
intentional acts, but the conduct is classified as "intentional"
only when the actor knows or knows with substantial certainty
that harm will ensue from the act.' 8 ' If the actor knows or,
from facts which she possesses, has reason to know that there
only is a very strong probability, and not a substantial cer-
tainty, that harm may result from the act, the conduct is
classified as "reckless.,
182
InAnderson, the Supreme Court ofWisconsin failed to follow
the orthodox distinctions laid down in the Restatement. It
confused intentional conduct with reckless conduct, declaring
that the tort of bad faith "is an intentional one" 1" and then
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
Although § 500 speaks of the risk ofphysical harm, one may equate the type of"harm"
involved in the tort of bad faith to that in defamation where the United States Supreme
Court has adopted the "knowing or reckless disregard" standard in certain situations.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964) (applying the "knowing
or reckless standard" to a libel case involving a public official). In these situations, the
degree of knowledge possessed by the actor pertains to the truth or falsity of the matter
communicated. In first-party bad-faith situations, the degree of knowledge pertains to
the legitimacy of the basis for refusing to pay a claim. In either case, the actor is liable
for harm arising from the conduct when the requisite state of mind exits. Thus, the term
"harm" is used in this sense in this Article when considering whether the insurer knows
or has reason to know that it has no reasonable basis for denying a first-party claim.
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1965).
177. The Restatement uses the terms "knowing or having reason to know." See id.
§ 500. "Having reason to know" means that the actor has information from which a
person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer
that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon the
assumption that such fact exists. Id. § 12.
178. See id. § 500 cmt. a.
179. Id.
180. See i. cmt. f.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
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adding the statement that the cause of action will lie both
when an insurer knows that it has no reasonable basis for
denying a claim and when an insurer recklessly disregards
the fact that it has no reasonable basis for denial."& According
to the Restatement, a tort is not exclusively intentional if
recovery is also allowed for reckless conduct. 1" Nonetheless,
the Anderson court went on to explain that knowledge could
be "inferred and imputed" when the insurer recklessly disre-
gards the fact that there is no reasonable basis for denial or
is recklessly indifferent to facts or proofs submitted by the
insured."' The court cast doubt on what it really meant to
say about the standard of culpability for the tort of bad faith,
somewhat like a thirteenth chime of a clock bringing into
question the accuracy of the previous twelve. What did the
Anderson court mean by defining intent to include reckless
conduct? There are several possibilities.
One possibility is that the Anderson court literally meant
what it said. The new cause of action is solely an intentional
tort, but it is of a different stripe than that found in the Re-
statement. In its explanation of how an insurer might be held
to know there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim,
the court said such knowledge might be "inferred and imputed"
where the insurer recklessly disregards the facts."8 7 Implicit
in this formulation is the notion that the insurer is in posses-
sion of the facts. One might interpret the opinion to mean that
actual knowledge may be proved by a showing that the insurer
possessed the facts without having to prove that the insurer
was aware that it possessed them or, if it was aware the facts
existed, that the insurer was aware of their meaning. Under
such an interpretation, the insurer will not be allowed to
ignore or to be indifferent to facts that are in its possession.
The insurer could be liable even when it misplaced a claim file,
as there would be no requirement that the insurer actually
act on the claim at all.
This interpretation of the Anderson opinion, of course, flies
in the face of the Restatement definition, which requires a high
184. See supra text accompanying note 163.
185. See supra note 159.
186. See 271 N.W.2d at 377.
187. Id-
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level of cognition of harm-awareness by the insurer that the
facts give no reasonable basis for denying a claim in our
case1 -for an intentional tort. Awareness of the meaning of
the facts only is imputed under reckless conduct, not inten-
tional conduct, and awareness of their mere existence never
is imputed to establish either intentional or reckless conduct.
However, awareness of both the existence and the meaning
of the facts may be imputed as the basis for negligent
conduct.189 These points are crucial in any attempt to
distinguish between a subjective and objective test, as shown
below.
One might argue that the Anderson court, when it denomi-
nated the tort of bad faith as "an intentional one," meant only
that an intentional act was involved, that is, the insurer con-
sciously must deny or refuse to pay the claim rather than
inadvertently failing to act on the claim. If the insurer
consciously denies the claim, there must have been a reason-
able basis for the denial, whether or not the insurer was aware
of it at the time of denial. Otherwise, the insurer will be
liable, but the insurer would not be liable when it failed to act
on a claim at all. This interpretation of the Anderson opinion,
however, taken to its logical conclusion, would appear to
countenance a recovery based on negligence.190 The insurer
could be held liable for failing to exercise due care in assessing
the facts or law applicable to its handling of the claim. This
outcome would contradict the spirit of the opinion inAnderson,
if not the letter, because the court seems to contemplate a
subjective requirement, rather than a purely objective one.
The insurer must to some degree be cognizant of the fact that
there is no reasonable basis for denial, even if its knowledge
188. See supra note 159.
189. Because the standard of culpability for negligence involves an objective test,
i.e., a comparison with the conduct of an ordinary prudent person, the actor may be
negligent for failing to appreciate what is observable as well as for the failure to observe
in the first place. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 174, § 32, at 182-85.
190. This interpretation also could lead to strict liability if the insurer is to be held
liable even where an ordinary prudent insurer would not have known that there was
no reasonable basis for refusing to pay the claim at the time it was denied. This would
be a more extreme reading of the possible meaning of Anderson than a test that at least
involves some type of fault, such as negligence. There is no intimation that the Anderson
court intended to adopt any test of liability without fault.
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is constructive rather than real, in order to be held liable
under the test in Anderson. 9'
Although this interpretation does not contradict the
Restatement meaning of intent directly, 192 it fails to conform
to the Restatement definition because it omits any requirement
that the insurer appreciate the fact that its conduct will result
in an invasion of the insured's rights. Moreover, it leaves out
what appears to be the court's requirement of some kind of
a culpable state of mind, albeit a degree of culpability less than
that required for an intentional tort under the Restatement.
Thus, the language of the Anderson opinion appears to rule
out an interpretation that an objective standard, such as is
used in negligence actions, would suffice for the tort of bad
faith. Perhaps there is a better explanation if one just ignores
the label of intentional tort for the moment and examines the
conduct described by the court.
Despite the awkward efforts of the court to subsume reckless
conduct under the rubric of intentional conduct, a fair reading
of the entire case supports the proposition that recovery under
the new tort would be permitted when it is shown that there
was no reasonable basis for denying the claim and that at least
one of two possible culpable states of mind exist. As in a
traditional intentional tort context, if the insurer knows or
knows with substantial certainty that there is no reasonable
basis for denying the claim, the insurer is liable for inten-
tionally violating the insured's rights. Likewise, if the insurer
is aware of facts that actually cause it to realize that there
is a very high probability that there is no reasonable basis for
denying the claim, it is also liable for that conduct. Disregard
of such facts and their meaning would constitute the conscious
indifference that forms the first prong of the Restatement's
definition of reckless.'
93
If the Anderson opinion is interpreted this way, it is
substantially reconciled with the Restatement definitions of
intentional and reckless conduct and also remains internally
consistent. Then there is only one question left to be an-
swered. Should the insurer also be liable if the second
191. See 271 N.W.2d at 377.
192. See supra note 159.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
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prong-the "having reason to know" test-of the Restatement
definition of "reckless" is satisfied? In other words, does the
tort of bad faith apply when the insurer is aware of facts that
would put a reasonable insurer on notice that there is a very
high probability' 94 that no reasonable basis exists for denying
the claim, but the insurer in question fails to appreciate that
this is the situation?
Did the Wisconsin Supreme Court mean to answer this
question in the affirmative when it spoke of "inferring and
imputing" knowledge to the insurer? Or was the court simply
referring to the actual knowledge of a very high probability
required under the first prong of the Restatement definition
of reckless? On this issue, the opinion certainly is less than
clear. The word "infer" means that one should deduce the
existence of fact D once aware of the existence of facts A, B,
and C.195 This may support an interpretation that only the
first prong of the Restatement definition of reckless conduct
suffices for the tort of bad faith if the standard for culpability
is to require actual or something akin to actual knowledge.
For example, if all the circumstantial evidence leads to the
conclusion that the insured's death was accidental, the life
insurance carrier will not be heard to say that the claim for
double indemnity benefits is fairly debatable on the basis that
there is no direct evidence that it was accidental. To know
A, B, and C is to knowD in the eyes of the law because experi-
ence dictates such a result.
On the other hand, one may "impute" information for policy
reasons without regard to any deduction based on logic. 196 This
may argue more strongly for recognition of liability under the
second prong, where a reasonable person would be informed
by the facts possessed even though the insurer in question
actually is not aware of the meaning of the facts. For example,
an insurer may refuse to pay a claim on the basis of facts that
invoke a particular policy exclusion, unaware that every court
to litigate the issue has held the exclusion to be void as
violating public policy. This information could be imputed to
194. This would be the minimum requirement. The insurer would also be liable if
the known facts would put a reasonable insurer on notice that there was no reasonable
basis for denying the claim, not just a very high probability of a basis to deny the claim.
195. Webster's defines "infer" as "to derive as a conclusion from facts or premises."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 619 (1989).
196. Webstees defines "impute" as "to credit to a person or a cause." Id. at 607.
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the insurer on the policy grounds that to do so will encourage
insurers to keep abreast of the law and that insureds should
not have to obtain legal assistance needlessly. To know A, B,
and C means that the insurer will be held to know D even
though experience and logic do not dictate such a result. Did
the Wisconsin court mean to use the terms in these distinct
ways? Or did the court possibly mean to use these words
interchangeably, and, if so, which of the two meanings did it
have in mind?
It is doubtful that the court really had occasion to think
through such fine distinctions, and therefore one should not
draw too much meaning from the use of these two words in
the opinion. The problem really resolves itself into the broader
question of what ought to be the minimum standard of
culpability for the tort of bad faith. At this point, then, it may
be best to leave the Wisconsin opinion and think freely about
the broader question in order to define the complete range of
conduct that might qualify for some remedy and what the
remedies should be. Since this Article urges a statutory
solution to the problems that have arisen under the common-
law tort of bad faith, the issue of the appropriate standard for
culpability shall be discussed in the context of designing an
appropriate statute.
V. DESIGNING A STATUTORY SOLUTION
A. Defining the Standards for Liability
If there is to be a remedy for insureds who are treated
unfairly by their insurers in the claims settlement process (and
it is the thesis of this Article that there should be), surely this
remedy must be available where an insurer actually knows
that it has no reasonable basis for denying the claim of its in-
sured, but refuses to pay the claim anyway. If one agrees with
this proposition, only two basic questions remain: (1) how far
beyond this strict definition of an intentional tort should the
standard for liability extend?, and (2) what should the
remedies be where the standards are violated?
As to the first question, there does not seem to be any good
reason for denying a remedy when the degree of cognition
diminishes from that of actual knowledge to the point where
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the insurer only appreciates that there is a very high degree
of probability that there is no reasonable basis for denying the
insured's claim. To define the standard of culpability so as
to include the latter as well as former state of mind would
encompass not only the type of knowledge that traditionally
is required for an intentional tort, 19 both actual knowledge
and knowing with substantial certainty that harm will result,
but it also would include the first level of cognition under the
category of recklessness, as defined by the Restatement. 198
The key is awareness that the claim is not fairly debatable
and therefore should be paid.
In all these instances, it would be particularly offensive for
an insurance company to appreciate the fact that the claim
should be paid, but to refuse to do so on the slim hope that
it might succeed in defending a lawsuit brought to collect the
proceeds. Such conduct is precisely the kind of conduct that
the tort of bad faith should reach because it serves no useful
purpose and is destructive to the insured. This behavior
presents the strongest possible case for recovery of extra-
contractual damages. Failure to recognize a cause of action
for such arbitrary conduct not only would frustrate the process
of transferring and spreading risks of loss in our society, but
it also would permit insurers actually to profit from their
wrongful conduct by allowing them to earn income on funds
that rightfully belong to their insureds.
Less deliberate conduct poses more difficult questions.
Should the second prong of the Restatement definition of
reckless conduct'99 also be a basis for liability? When the
claimant can prove only that the insurer was in possession of
facts that would have put a reasonable insurance company on
notice that there was no reasonable basis or a high probability
that there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim,
should there be liability even though the insurer in question
did not appreciate the legal significance of the facts? This
question is the one that the Anderson decision fell short of
answering with any degree of clarity.200 In fact, it is a question
to which the answer is quite debatable.
197. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying note 179.
200. See supra text accompanying and following note 194.
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The state of mind that is declared to be culpable by the
second prong of the Restatement's definition of recklessness
is determined in part by an objective standard, whereas the
first prong of the definition utilizes a purely subjective stan-
dard.20 1 These two forms of culpability are not the same. The
objective standard does not require any awareness of harm
and sounds more like negligence, a lesser form of egregious
conduct, albeit a case of very serious neglect. The subjective
standard requires awareness and represents more egregious
conduct, a form of conduct involving a conscious disregard for
the rights of others. This is not merely a difference in degree,
but a difference in the kind of standard.
The insurer's awareness of its tenuous position makes its
conduct reprehensible because it knows it is withholding the
benefits of the contract that very likely belong to the insured.
This permits ulterior motives, such as the desire to enhance
investment income, to come into play, which in turn tends to
provide incentives to corrupt the system. This is not the case
with inadvertent conduct, because there is no conscious
decision to deny benefits wrongfully. Thus, one could argue
that any cause of action for an insurer's refusal to honor its
agreement to pay benefits to an insured should involve only
cognitive forms of conduct. The insurer at least should be
aware to a very great degree, even though not absolutely sure,
that there is no reasonable basis for denying the claim. Mere
negligence, no matter how serious, does not involve the
conscious manipulation of the claims process and, although
deplorable, is less reprehensible. Ulterior motives for denying
claims do not exist to provide debilitating incentives. Based
on this reasoning, one could conclude that, since the second
prong of the Restatement definition of reckless embodies some
inadvertent conduct, there should be no liability for the
situation where the insurer fails to realize that it has little
or no basis for denying the claim. If this position is accepted,
it also would follow that a negligent, or even grossly negligent,
failure to pay, should not be actionable.
Perhaps this distinction is what the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin had in mind in Anderson, and, if so, it would be a logical
one. It certainly is the type of bright-line distinction that the
201. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79,
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average juror could understand. The insurer must be aware
that what it is doing is unfounded before extra-contractual
damages are available. The question remains, however,
whether such a distinction would balance the scales fairly
between the insured and insurer. Are there any countervailing
arguments in favor of extending liability to the type of
inadvertent conduct found in the second prong of the Restate-
ment definition of reckless conduct?
Any justification for abandoning the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale by allowing recovery for tortious breach of the con-
tract between an insurer and its insured must derive from the
broader purposes of tort law. Traditionally, two of these pur-
poses have been the deterrence of antisocial conduct and the
compensation of innocent victims of that conduct, 22 and they
are no less important because the duty underlying the tort of
bad faith arises from a contractual relationship. Developments
in the law discussed above establish that intentional and other
conscious abuses by insurers should be deterred by requiring
compensation of insureds who are damaged by such conduct.
Without such sanctions, insurers will be tempted to deny
claims for ulterior motives.
This reasoning emphasizes the deterrent goal of tort law,
but another purpose of tort law is to admonish people to act
more responsibly. 3 The developments referred to above
indicate that insurers should be liable when they are in posses-
sion of facts that would put a reasonable insurer on notice that
there was no reasonable basis, or that it was highly unlikely
that there was a reasonable basis, for denying an insured's
claim. Here the insurer is seriously at fault, and the innocent
insured should not have to bear the losses that flow from the
insurer's conduct when those losses could have been avoided
if the insurer had acted more responsibly. Such a liability rule
would encourage insurers to investigate properly and to
evaluate accurately claims in a timely manner, paying those
that should be paid and denying the others. If an insurer has
information in its file that mandates a particular response,
the insurer should act on that information as a reasonable
202. See SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. SYS., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., TOWARDS A
JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSICE
IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-1 to -225 (1984).
203. Id. at 4-3, 4-13.
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insurer would. To stop short of including deviations from this
standard of conduct in the basis of liability for the new tort
will permit insurers to feign ignorance and put an unfair
burden on insureds to prove that the insurer was cognizant
of the fact it had no reasonable basis for denying the claim.
Moreover, there would be fewer incentives for insurers to
institute training programs and to take other steps to improve
both the skills of their employees and the claims process in
general.
On the other hand, the argument does not go so far as to
include purely negligent acts by the insurer.2°4 The require-
ment that the insurer actually possess the information upon
which it should have acted should suffice to rule out claims
that the insurer merely should have exercised greater care in
handling the claim. This test also would avoid litigation of
the requisite degree of appreciation or awareness that would
occur if the second prong were not included and one had to
draw a distinction between the levels of cognition that
distinguish the two prongs.
In addition, if an investigation is inadequate for the purpose
of a response and the insurer knows or has reason to know
that this is the situation, it should be liable for failing to
complete the investigation when an appropriate investigation
would have shown that the claim was not fairly debatable.
Willful ignorance of the facts should not absolve the insurer
from liability. Thus, when the insurer actually possesses the
information to draw the correct conclusion or facts that
indicate that it needs to go forward to acquire that
204. Although the broader purposes oftort law are also served by holdingpeople liable
for negligent conduct, the gravamen of the tortious conduct here is primarily that of
economic loss arising out of a breach of contract. Where purely economic loss arises from
an interference with contractual relations, courts usually have required that the harm
be caused intentionally. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 174, at § 129, 997-1002. To extend
the statutory basis of culpability to include negligence would greatly increase the number
of situations where the jury could "second-guess" the insurer, thereby subjecting the
insurer to liability for tort damages where it was barely more probable than not that
the insurer had failed to exercise ordinary care in handling a claim. Thus, the insurer,
as a practical matter, could be liable for consequential damages in almost every case
where a claim is denied and it is subsequently determined that it should have been paid.
It would be better to avoid this type of exposure and litigation by providing for strict
liability where the claim has not been paid within a certain period of time, but limiting
the claimant's recovery to interest and attorneys' fees. See infra text accompanying and
following note 221. This more fairly balances the interests between the parties while
avoiding needless litigation over fault.
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information, the insurer should be encouraged to do what is
necessary so that a proper response may be given. This is not
too great a burden to place on insurers, as the argument does
not go so far as to hold the insurer accountable for all mistakes
and errors that inevitably arise from a mere failure to exercise
due care. Insureds do make inaccurate, groundless, and even
fraudulent claims2 °. and insurers need some margin of error
within which to operate, but this margin should not extend
into the area of conduct described as reckless under the
Restatement of Torts. Moreover, when the goal of compen-
sation is considered, the answer is even clearer. Because this
is the type of conduct that could be avoided by encouraging
insurers to act more responsibly, there is no good reason for
not permitting an insured to collect extra-contractual damages.
An innocent insured should not be expected to absorb all the
harm that reasonably could have been avoided had the insurer
acted in accordance with the standards of the industry.
Having set out the arguments for and against the proposition
of limiting the insurer's duty to conscious violations of the
insured's rights, it would appear that there is a strong case
for going beyond this standard in cases of serious neglect, that
is, when the insurer has reason to know that it is wrong in
denying a claim. On balance, I conclude that both prongs of
the Restatement definition of reckless should be used as a
basis for insurer liability. Insurers need to act responsibly,
and it is not asking too much to hold them to the standards
of their own industry, especially when the insurer has facts
in its possession from which a reasonable insurer would deter-
mine either that the claim is valid or that more investigation
is required to make that decision.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that a full-blown measure of tort
damages should be available in every situation, regardless of the
nature of the insurer's conduct. In recognizing a tort duty on the
part of the insurer, it should be kept in mind that the duty would
not exist absent the contractual relationship. The primary risk of
harm to the insured involves a pure economic loss, a failure to pay
the policy benefits, rather than bodily injury or property damage.
205. It has been estimated that insurance claim fraud exceeds $17 billion a year.
See C. David Sullivan,Another Perspective: It Takes Tcamwork to Fight Insurance Fraud,
NAVL UNDERWRITER (Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management ed.), Aug. 17,1992,
at 21.
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The tort duty only comes into play with regard to consequential
and punitive damages. Even then, the wrong still is one primarily
for interfering with a property right, not personal injury.2°6 Thus,
any tort remedy should be appropriately tailored to the wrong,
something that the common-law process has not done very well.
B. The Measure of Compensatory Damages
for Wrongfully Refusing to Pay Claims
One of the problems with using the common-law process to design
a new tort is inherent in the process itself. Courts would not
recognize a new tort if they were not presented with fact situations
that they find compelling. Typically, these cases present extreme
examples of conduct or harm. As the law develops, however, the
new cause of action may be extended to cover similar fact patterns
that involve less egregious conduct. That is how the process works
as the courts flesh out the law, and that is certainly what has
happened with the so-called tort of bad faith. It was first recognized
as an intentional tort 20 7 and later extended to reckless conduct.218
Some courts have even gone on to include negligence2 °9 and possibly
strict liability210 as the basis for liability. Yet the possibility of a
reduced measure of tort damages, as lesser forms of wrongdoing
are recognized as the bases for liability, never has been seriously
considered.21' The courts seem to be guided more by labels, such
as "contract" or "tort," when it is the nature of the wrong that
should determine the precise measure of damages. 212 To label
something as a tort does not necessarily mean that all tort damages
should be available. In the context of the development of the tort
of bad faith, the propriety of a full measure of tort damages would
seem questionable at the outset. The relationship is primarily an
206. See Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 806 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Cal. 1991).
207. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Cal. 1973).
208. See supra text accompanying note 165.
209. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
211. This issue is raised in some torts textbooks. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND
COMPENSATION 601-03 (1985) (listing several possible directions reform of strict liability
may take, but notconsidering a reduced measure of tort damages among the possibilities).
212. Some courts that have permitted recovery of consequential damages under a
theory of breach of contract rather than tort have limited the remedy to economic losses.
See supra note 126.
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economic one and the harm is most likely to reflect that fact.
Serious economic repercussions may flow from the insurer's denial
of a claim, but rarely does the insurer cause bodily harm or physical
damage to property. Emotional distress may occasionally result
in bodily harm, but any medical expenses, including psychotherapy,
would be treated as part of the economic loss. In fact, pure
emotional distress is the least important candidate for redress.
Emotional distress recoveries inherently are difficult to
administer, and emotional distress caused by the tort of bad faith
is no exception. Under this tort, no bodily injury usually exists so
there is less evidence to support the existence of serious emotional
distress. The courts recognized this problem when they created
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.213
Two elements of this tort are that the actor's conduct be outrageous
by societal standards and that the victim's distress be extreme.214
Even with these limitations, the courts have not found it easy to
decide when conduct is actionable under this tort.215 Yet the courts
generally have not applied these or similar limitations in defining
the tort of bad faith.216 A few courts have required that there be
economic harm, other than that represented by the denial of policy
benefits, before a recovery may be had for emotional distress,217 but
the decisions of others may be read to mean that there is no
requirement of independent economic harm at all.28 Most courts,
however, have not discussed whether the recovery of damages for
213. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 174, § 12.
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
215. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 174, § 12, at 57-64.
216. In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of California disap-
proved a prior bad-faith case that had held that there must be evidence of severe emotion-
al distress to support an award for such damages. 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 (Cal. 1973); see
also Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 376,382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(rejecting the requirement that the defendant intentionally cause the distress or that
the distress be severe); Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751, 761
(N.D. 1980) (rejecting the requirement that distress be severe); Timmons v. Royal Globe
Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 916 (Okla. 1982) (rejecting the requirement that conduct be
outrageous or distress be severe). But see Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d
368, 378-79 (Wis. 1978) (requiring that the distress be severe).
217. See Filasky v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 76, 82-83 (Ariz. 1987);
Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1041-42; Smith, 294 N.W.2d at 761; Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at
378.
218. See Tynes v. Bankers Life Co., 730 P.2d 1115, 1127 (Mont. 1986); Braesch v.
Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 778-79 (Neb. 1991); Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986); see also Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 893 (Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the insurer's contention that a
showing of damages apart from emotional distress and loss of the contract benefits itself
was required).
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emotional distress should be limited in any of the manners
mentioned above.
This lack of limitation is particularly troublesome in bad-faith
cases because some emotional distress will almost always
accompany the denial of a claim. People get very upset when
insurance companies reject their claims, and thus such damages
can be claimed in almost every case. Yet emotional distress is by
nature not capable of elimination on an ad hoc basis through
monetary damages. Consequently, it really does not further the
tort goal of compensation, nor is it an efficacious way of assuaging
an insured's feelings. People probably do not feel any more
charitable towards insurers once they have collected their
benefits.219 Perhaps this is because much, if not all, of the award
for emotional distress may go to pay for attorneys' fees and other
costs of the litigation. Rarely do insureds break even. There are
other ways to make sure that insurers act responsibly in settling
claims and that insureds are adequately compensated. Emotional
distress should be omitted as an element of damages in the tort
of bad faith in favor of more effective remedies.
Economic losses, on the other hand, including any medical
expenses incurred as a result of emotional distress, should be
recoverable in addition to the contract benefits. This kind of
compensation is capable of returning an insured to her economic
status quo ante, insofar as it is possible to do so. Thus, where an
insurance company has conducted a thorough and complete investi-
gation of a claim and the facts show that there is either no basis
or a very tenuous basis for denying it, and the insurer either knows
this or a reasonable insurer possessed of this information would
know it, and still denies the claim, the insurance company should
be liable for all consequential damages. The same should be true
both when the insurance company fails to conduct any investigation
at all and when the investigation is inadequate and the insurer
knows or has reason to know that it is inadequate.
As discussed above, the compensatory goal of tort law2 0 warrants
the imposition of damages for any economic losses caused by the
insurer's refusal to pay the claim, where the insurer intentionally
219. In a study involving claims for pain and suffering arising from automobile
accidents, the findings indicated that "whether one was paid--or how much one was
paid-for pain and suffering had no significant relationship in assuaging any feelings
of resentment." See Jeffrey O'Connell & Rita J. Simon, Payment for Pain & Suffering:
Who Wants What, When & Why, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 46.
220. See supra text following note 205.
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or recklessly denies a claim. Insurance companies also should be
motivated to investigate properly and to respond to claims by being
held responsible for any economic losses caused to the insured, but
this should not be all the relief to which insureds are entitled. If
damages for emotional distress are to be eliminated, two other
remedies are needed to complete the picture because not all cases
will involve only out-of-pocket economic loss. Some will involve loss
of use of the money owed to claimants; in addition, the claimant
often will incur attorneys' fees and related costs. Without remedies
for these items, insurers still may find that there is some advantage
in abusing the system.
C. Interest and Attorneys' Fees
An insured should be entitled to recover interest in any case in
which its insurer fails to pay a claim within a statutorily prescribed
time period after proof of loss has been submitted to the insurer.
The rate of interest should be specified in the statute2 1 and
calculated on the amount due, but not yet paid, under the policy
from the time of loss. In addition, the statute should provide for
reasonable attorneys' fees and any court costs and related expenses
when it has become reasonably necessary for the claimant to seek
legal assistance. The award for attorneys' fees and interest should
not depend on any tort standard of culpability. Failure to process
claims in a timely manner is the trigger. These fees and expenses,
however, should be reimbursable only when the insurer, either by
settlement or adjudication, is required to pay benefits in excess of
any amount that the insurer offered to pay prior to the engagement
of such services.
These types of relief would be an appropriate substitute for
damages for emotional distress because they should help assuage
an insured's feelings. Knowledge by the insured that full economic
recovery is available in the event he prevails should assist in the
prevention of emotional distress. Recognition of entitlement to
221. The rate could be fixed by statute or it could be a rate that would vary according
to the market rate of a particular interest bearing instrument, such as one-year United
States Treasury bills. For examples of modern statutes providing specific rates of interest
on overdue insurance claims, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436 (West 1990)
(providing 1 1/2% interest per month after the claim due date) and WYO. STAT. § 26-15-
124(c) (1991) (providing 10% interest per annum).
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interest on the money that is due under the contract and the
attorneys' fees when it is necessary to engage a lawyer to collect
the benefits not only serves the valuable purpose of reimbursement
of expenses, but also the equally valuable purpose of prevention
of emotional distress in the first place. Inclusion of attorneys' fees
and costs would also provide incentives for insureds to bring
meritorious claims, rather than failing to bring an action because
of the fear of having to expend a substantial percentage of a
relatively small award to collect it. From the insurer's standpoint,
there are also advantages. The remedies for interest and attorneys'
fees are not subject to manipulation by juries, as are awards for
emotional distress, and the relief is more in keeping with that
usually found in commercial situations. Thus, these are reasonable
remedies to substitute for emotional distress damages.
D. Punitive Damages
The final remedy to be addressed is punitive damages. There
are two situations in which this remedy should be available. The
first is based on a distinction between knowledge and motive.'
For the recovery of consequential economic harm, the tort of bad
faith should rest on the various levels of cognition described
above.' If the requisite knowledge is proved, the claimant may
recover for any economic losses caused by the insurer's wrongful
failure to pay the claim. Where the insurer is proven to have acted
with an evil motive, however, punitive damages should be
available.z
The second situation that should give rise to punitive awards is
closely related to the first in that it would strongly imply an evil
mind, even if it did not exist in fact. The insurer should be subject
to punitive damages when it engages in a general business practice
of denying claims in whole or in part without a reasonable basis
for doing so. This kind of conduct is similar to the denial of claims
for an evil motive for several reasons. When an insurer consistently
and arbitrarily forces claimants to resort to legal process, an evil
222. See supra note 172.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 197-201.
224. This is the traditional basis for awarding punitive damages. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 & cmts. a, b (1979).
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motive surely is inferable. This result should be the same when
an insurer overreaches or makes it a practice to "chisel" claimants,
that is, never offers to pay the full amount until forced to do so.
This conduct is oppressive to individual claimants because they are
less likely to seek legal assistance when an insurer offers to settle
for something close to the full value of the claim, even though they
are entitled to more.' In the aggregate, this can amount to
substantial sums of money.22 Both practices are extremely
detrimental to the institution of loss spreading through insurance,
an institution that is essential to our economic well-being.
Availability of punitive damages in these situations would not only
have the effect of punishing insurers for engaging in malicious
conduct toward their insureds, but it also would give insureds an
incentive to bring the lawsuits that would deter such conduct.
Thus, it would serve as an admonition to other insurers while
providing a needed sense of vindication for those insureds who have
suffered from such callous conduct.
Limiting the availability of punitive damages to these situations,
however, does not mean that the present practice of permitting
juries to award punitive damages without any particular monetary
limit should be continued. Insurers must carry large financial
reserves to protect against unexpected, as well as expected, losses
if they are to remain solvent. These reserves represent the funds
that have been pooled by insureds to protect against losses that
they may incur. To the extent these funds are used as a basis for
calculating and paying punitive awards against insurers, they are
being diverted to a purpose that was never intended by the
insureds. Thus, it is inappropriate to assess multi-million dollar
awards based largely on an insurer's net worth in order to exact
punishment and to deter. This tends to punish the insuring public
more than the insurer. It also is unnecessary because the publicity
of a significant award is almost punishment enough. Who wants
to buy insurance from an insurer that has a reputation for being
dishonest when it comes to paying claims?
The purposes of punitive damages would be met if the
legislature enacted a provision limiting the recovery of any
punitive award to twice the amount of the compensatory award,
including the policy benefits, and any other economic harm, or
225. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790,792, 793-95 & nn.1-2 (Nev. 1991).
226. Id. at 795.
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$250,000, whichever is greater. 7 This approach provides for
flexibility. The claimant who, because of malicious conduct by
an insurer, suffers a compensable loss less than $125,000 would
be permitted to recover a substantial punitive award, but the
limit of $250,000 would prevent an excessive award. On the
other hand, when the compensable loss exceeds $125,000, the
ceiling on any punitive award would rise commensurately. There
would be no limit in a case involving large amounts of money
except for the trebling effect provided by the formula. The
formula also would be appropriate for awards based on a business
practice because the insurer would be subject to multiple awards.
Each claimant could sue for punitive damages even though the
compensatory award might be relatively small. This approach
strikes a fair balance among those concerned. The award would
punish and deter and yet not subject the insurer to
inappropriately and unnecessarily large awards that are all too
likely to be influenced by antagonistic feelings against insurers
in general.
Under the proposal outlined above, an insured would have
available a reasonable range of remedies based on differences
in the seriousness of the wrong. When the insurance company
has acted in the most egregious manner, the remedies would
include punitive damages, but as the level of culpability
diminishes to the point where an insurer is neither in fact aware
nor in a position to be held liable as though it were aware that
there is no reasonable basis for denying the claim, tort damages
would not be available at all. In between these two extremes,
compensatory damages should be limited to recoveries for
economic loss. Recoveries for emotional distress should not be
allowed. In order to make the insured completely whole,
however, attorneys' fees should be recoverable where the insurer's
failure to respond has necessitated resort to the services of an
attorney to collect the policy benefits. In addition, the insured
in all situations should be entitled to interest on the amounts
due under the policy from the date of loss when the insurance
company has not paid the claim within a legislatively prescribed
time period. This straightforward approach will provide a clear
standard of culpability for the tort of bad faith and strike a better
balance between the parties regarding available remedies. It
should facilitate loss spreading in our society, rather than hinder
227. This approach was recommended by the American College of Trial Lawyers in
its Report on Punitive Damages. For this and other recommendations, see AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMNITEE ON SPECIAL
PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1989).
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it. It does not, however, appear to be a solution that our courts
can adopt. Legislative action will be required.
VI. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Upon reflection, one should not be surprised at the vexed
development of the new tort of bad faith. The rocky progress
probably was destined by the environment from which the tort
sprang. The effective functioning of any free enterprise system
requires predictable enforcement of promises involving economic
exchange. Parties may enter freely into agreements or not,
depending on which route seems most beneficial. They may
define the terms of any agreement so as to limit the respective
rights and responsibilities in any way they wish, absent some
countervailing public policy. Once agreement has been achieved,
however, there can be little room for higgling if the system is
to function efficiently. The terms must be enforced strictly so
that people can depend on the arrangement. Although the law
of contracts developed to facilitate and to complement these
relationships, in general it adhered to the basic principle that
the parties, not society, are in command of the terms. Any notion
of unliquidated damages for a breach of the relationship would
be antithetical.
This freedom in the contracting parties to establish the terms
of their relationship contrasts with tort law, where the duties
are largely imposed from without. This body of law was created
to adjust losses that arise from human activity, activity other
than making and enforcing promises. Therein lies an anomaly,
because the tort of bad faith arises only when a promise is
broken. For many years there was a relatively clear dividing
line; it was not a tort to breach a contract. 229 That, however, was
a rule for a different time and place.
As insurance contracts came to be perceived as having
significant institutional importance beyond their importance to
the contracting parties, first legislative and administrative
oversight was attempted. ' 0 These oversight mechanisms proved
insufficient, and eventually courts imposed new duties besides
those voluntarily assumed in the contract, duties classified as
228. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 174, § 1.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
230. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
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tort duties by most courts."1 The fact that insurers not only
draft the contracts but assume the primary responsibility under
the contracts means that the tort duties rest primarily, if not
exclusively, on insurers.
The imposition of these tort duties has had a dramatic impact
on the relationship between parties to an insurance contract, a
relationship that now is governed less by the individuals than
by society. Insurers may no longer treat insureds arbitrarily,
at least where that treatment results in harm beyond a denial
of the contract benefits. By deterring arbitrary conduct by
insurers, the common law attempted to ensure that the claims
process works efficiently and fairly. Nevertheless, this attempt
has not balanced fairly the competing interests of the parties.
It has foundered to a large degree on the failure to articulate a
clear standard by which this new relationship is to be governed.
This failure is serious because claims are not always justified.
Insureds can be just as greedy as insurers can be miserly. Both
can be dishonest. This failure to articulate a clear standard has
led to too many unwarranted claims of bad faith and needs to
be addressed. If this were the only problem with the new tort,
the courts could easily correct it, but it is not the only problem.
Courts can respond only in very limited ways to requests for
tort remedies. Traditionally, one of three levels of fault-either
intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct-is required.
Moreover, in most situations the only viable remedy is damages.
Although this is a crude system, it works fairly well when the
issue is whether to shift losses from those who suffer bodily
injury or property damage to those who have caused it. The
system's limitations are more evident in situations that do not
involve physical harm. There the stakes are different and the
rough engine of tort is not as readily available to allocate losses.
For example, tort remedies are recognized more sparingly when
the loss is purely economic2 or emotional in nature.m Although
in the last few years courts have been willing to extend tort
duties regarding pure emotional distress, this has not been as
true for pure economic loss. Before money damages are available
for the disruption of an economic relationship, there usually is
a requirement that the conduct reach a high level of egregious-
ness and the remedy of money damages usually is limited to
231. See supra notes 101-24 and accompanying text.
232. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 174, §§ 128-30.
233. Id. §§ 12, 54.
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losses that are endemic to the economic relationship. 4 Yet this
simple world of tort does not readily apply to breaches of
insurance relationships.
The relationship of an insurer to its insured is purely economic
in nature, but the risk sought to be transferred by the insured
to the insurer is often one of serious bodily harm or property
damage. Even when the risk insured against is one of pure
economic loss or not easily measured in economic terms at all,
the financial and other consequences of absorbing the loss can
be staggering and in its own way very debilitating to the insured.
Thus, in many instances, an insurance contract has a hybrid
quality. On the surface, it reflects a pure economic relationship
between the parties, but below the surface it may represent the
insured's sole protection against potential catastrophe." This
quality of insurance contracts may well call for a remedy of
money damages when the insurer acts improperly, but the
availability of money damages in some circumstances does not
mean that the insurer should be liable for consequential damages
in all instances where it fails to pay a claim that it should have
paid. Room must be left for legitimate disagreement. Yet, under
the present state of the law, it is not clear where the boundary
is to be drawn. Moreover, even if the courts eventually were to
draw that boundary, the traditional tort remedies applied by the
courts are too crude to achieve the fine balance that is needed
for this unusual tort. It is doubtful that the courts ever will
achieve this balance, and, even if they do, it will be a long and
fitful process.
In contrast, legislatures are not limited to the traditional tort
standards for defining the various levels of culpability, nor are
they limited to the single remedy of monetary damages. They
can fashion a solution that is more precisely tailored to the
conduct involved and that balances the legitimate interests of
insurers and insureds, and of society, and do it all at once. This
method of resolution is preferable to that of the common-law
process, particularly where insurers continue to face a double-
barreled problem-the varying standards under the common law
of a number of different states and the incomplete definitions
of culpability within any particular jurisdiction, not to mention
the prospect of having to pay for emotional distress in every case.
This threat is of no mean proportions because it leaves too much
234. See ic §§ 128-30.
235. See supra text accompanying and following note 45.
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leeway within which the trier of fact may maneuver, a maneuver-
ability that is apt to be exercised not in an even-handed way,
but in favor of claimants and against insurance companies. The
time has come for the legislatures to act and there is no better
organization to initiate that action than the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws.
This organization should appoint a committee to draft a Uniform
Act on the subject of insurer claim practices for first-party insurance.
Through this process a balanced approach may be developed, and
once the Act is approved it can be submitted to the various states
for adoption. This method is to be preferred to a state-by-state,
piecemeal approach, either through the courts or the legislatures.2
The attached model of such an act 7 shows how simply and
efficiently the rights and obligations of the parties could be
addressed. Although this draft may not be perfect,2 it is a vast
236. In my opinion, there is another reason why a uniform act promulgated by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws would be salutary. In Pilot Life Insurance Co.
v. Dedeaux, the United States Supreme Court held that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988)), preempts state common-law tort and contract actions asserting
improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan.
481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987). This impacts claimants who are insured through group contracts
provided by their employers and which cover medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death. The civil enforcement remedies
set forth in ERISA are exclusive. Id, at 52. However, were the states to enact a uniform
scheme providing standards for wrongful failures by insurers to pay insurance claims,
such laws arguably would fall within an ERISA exception for state statutes that regulate
the business of insurance and would not be preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,63-65 (1990) (interpreting
the ERISA preemption exemption for state laws regulating the insurance business).
237. See infra Appendix.
238. The proposed statute is limited to first-party insurance situations and then only
to failures by insurers to pay benefits that are due under the insurance contract. It is
arguable that the duty to defendunder a liability insurance policy is a type of first-party
benefit and that the statute should also include breaches of this duty. Two of the three
jurisdictions that have explicitly addressed this issue extended the common-law tort of
bad faith to apply to wrongful refusals by liability insurers to defend their insureds.
See supra note 83.
I do not favor the extension of the tort of bad faith to situations involving promises
by insurers that are collateral to the purpose of the insurance contract, i.e., to transfer
and distribute the risk of loss from the hazard for perils against which the protection
was sought. Promises that are collateral to this purpose deserve no more protection than
otherwise provided under contract law. For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that a fire insurer's failure to give a copy of the investigation report regarding the cause
of the insured's fire to the insured after it had orally promised to do so gave rise to a
cause of action for the tort of bad faith, even though the insurer paid the full amount
of the benefits under the first-party fire policy in a timely manner. See Rawlings v.
Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 579 (Ariz. 1986). After the insurer made the promise regarding
the report, it discovered it also had the liability coverage for the neighbor who was
suspected of negligently starting the fire. I& at 568. The promise was clearly collateral,
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improvement over the decisional law that attempts to define the
tort of bad faith.
CONCLUSION
Although the courts responded to the need for relief from the
unfair claims practices of insurers, the common-law remedy has
foundered because of the judicial inability to strike an
appropriate balance between the parties to an insurance contract.
A substantial number of jurisdictions have purported to adopt
the tort of bad faith, but there has been altogether too little
attention given to defining the standard of culpability. Moreover,
traditional tort remedies have not provided for attorneys' fees
and interest, relief which should be available in any case where
an insurer culpably refuses to discharge its obligation to pay
claims in a timely manner. This is a better remedy than
permitting insureds to claim damages for emotional distress.
The latter really does not compensate the insured for the actual
loss suffered, whereas the former would. Therefore, it is time
for more decisive action and that action can come only through
legislation. There is no more timely project for the Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws to undertake than to appoint a drafting
committee to develop a uniform act on the subject of unfair
claims practices by insurers.
as it did not involve any benefit or other obligation under the fire policy. Moreover, it
had nothing to do with the central purpose of insurance contracts, i.e., the shifting and
distribution of losses. It was only in aid of the insured bringing a tort action against
a third party. As the dissent pointed out, the failure to provide the report may have
been actionable under another theory, such as breach of contract, fraud, or misrepresen-
tation, but it certainly did not warrant a remedy under tort law. See id. at 580 (Holohan,
C.J., dissenting). The proposed statute would not provide a remedy for this type of
situation.
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APPENDIX
MODEL FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CLAIMS ACT
SECTION 1. PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY OF [ACT]
The purpose of this [Act] is to regulate the business of
insurance in this state. The [Act] applies to all insurers licensed
to do business or doing business in this state, but it does not
apply to an action by an insured or a third party for wrongful
failure to provide a defense or to settle a claim of a third party
under a liability insurance contract.
SECTION 2. INSURER'S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING
An insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to its
insured and to any other claimant seeking benefits under its
insurance contract and may be liable for a breach of this duty
if it fails to pay benefits that are due under the insurance
contract in accordance with this [Act].
SECTION 3. INTEREST DUE FOR DELAY IN
PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
If an insured loss occurs and the insurer fails to pay the claim
in full within [30] days after proof of loss is submitted to and
written demand is made upon the insurer for payment, the
insurer shall pay the claimant, in addition to the amount due
under the insurance contract, [ 12] percent interest on the amount
due and unpaid. The interest shall be calculated from the date
of loss to the date payment in full is tendered to the claimant.
The insurer may tender payment to the claimant in cash, check,
or draft by delivering the payment to the claimant in person or
by mailing the payment to the claimant at the address shown
on the claim submitted to the insurer. If the claimant fails to
provide an address on the claim submitted, no interest shall be
due or payable to the claimant.
SECTION 4. BAD-FAITH REFUSAL TO PAY CLAIMS
(1) An insurer is guilty of bad-faith refusal to pay a claim if
it refuses to pay the claim without having a reasonable basis for
its refusal and, at the time of the refusal, also:
(a) knows or knows with substantial certainty that there
is no reasonable basis for denying the claim; or
(b) knows that there is a very high probability that there
is no reasonable basis for denying the claim; or
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(c) is aware of facts that would put a reasonable insurer
on notice that there is no reasonable basis or that there is
a very high probability that there is no reasonable basis for
denying the claim.
(2) An insurer is not guilty of bad-faith refusal to pay a claim
if a reasonable insurer would consider the claim fairly debatable
in law or fact.
SECTION 5. DAMAGES FOR BAD-FAITH REFUSAL
TO PAY CLAIMS
(1) If an insurer is guilty of bad-faith refusal to pay a claim,
the claimant may recover damages for economic loss caused by
such refusal.
(2) Punitive damages may also be awarded if the trier of fact
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer, in acting
in bad faith, either:
(a) had an evil motive in refusing to pay the claim; or
(b) engaged in such conduct with claimants as a general
business practice.
(3) Punitive damages may not exceed $250,000 or an amount
that is twice the total of any compensatory award for policy
benefits and economic losses, whichever is greater.
SECTION 6. ATTORNEYS' FEES
If the services of an attorney are reasonably necessary to
prosecute and collect an insurance claim under this [Act], the
insurer shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees. In
determining the amount of the fee, all benefits to the claimant,
including those to accrue in the future as well as those that have
already accrued, shall be taken into consideration. If the claim
is settled or prosecuted to judgment and the claimant fails to
obtain a settlement or judgment for an amount in excess of that
which may have been offered by the insurer, the insurer is not
liable for attorneys' fees under this [Act].
SECTION 7. EFFECTIVE DATE
This [Act] shall take effect on ....
